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This study uses core elements of the system-of-systems (SoS) engineering process to 
obtain lessons learned, which are then used to recommend process and organizational 
changes to facilitate an SoS approach to current and future U.S. Army acquisitions. The 
study finds that an SoS approach is necessary to accommodate the capability-based 
process that drives the Army acquisition system. Recommendations include incorporating 
SoS engineers in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System process to build 
and standardize SoS architectures; using a chief integration officer throughout the SoS 
life cycle to provide expertise on integration and interoperability; and establishing 
guidelines for integrated product teams and lead system integrators. The SoS acquisition 
approach will also benefit from capability portfolio managers using consolidated funding 
as opposed to the current stove-piped funding. The SoS wave model can be incorporated 
in the operation and support phase to support iterative SoS evolution. The Army 
acknowledges that many current systems are, or have the potential to be, part of an SoS 
environment; however, the current acquisition processes and organizational structure are 
based on stand-alone system acquisitions. The recommendations of this study describe 
how the Army can support SoS acquisition.   
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The Army acquisition process is tailored to specify, develop, and acquire individual 
systems. This is evident in the policies, processes, and organizational structure of the 
acquisition workforce. Systems engineering is often found in Army policy and 
acquisition guidelines, but system-of-systems (SoS) engineering is not. This study 
determined that, based on the increasing need for systems to be interoperable with one 
another, an SoS approach to acquisitions is more suitable for current and future 
acquisition programs. This study used core elements of SoS engineering to analyze past 
Army SoS acquisition efforts, and used the lessons learned to recommend process and 
organizational changes that would enable the Army to go from a systems approach to an 
SoS-based approach for future acquisitions. The main process change recommendations 
are that the Army should: 
 
• utilize DODAF for current and future Army acquisitions, and apply DODAF 
to document the SoS architecture.  
 
• formally incorporate a Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
(DODAF) high-level operational concept graphic(OV-1) for SoS concept of 
operations (CONOPS) development and consider adding other DODAF 
models as mandatory model requirements for the acquisition process; 
 
• mandate that private firms demonstrate the ability for technology 
developments to integrate with an existing or future SoS—further, the Army 
should reward private firms that demonstrate innovative ways to use 
technologies to integrate existing or future systems into an SoS; 
 
• initially allocate funding at the SoS level, and divide up funding into 
constituent systems based on each system’s objectives during an SoS 
acquisition; 
 
• simultaneously test as many SoS constituent systems as feasible during the 
system development and demonstration phase and clearly state assumptions 
used during testing—these assumptions must be clearly articulated in the test 
plan, and the test plan also must describe the impacts to the system if the 
assumptions do not hold true; 
 
 xviii 
• have the program manager (PM) evaluation process emphasize the PM’s 
efforts to integrate his or her program into its SoS framework; and 
• use the SoS wave model as an assessment tool for SoS architectural evolutions 
and future SoS updates.  
This study found that some of the organizational changes that could be 
incorporated are: 
• The Army should train and designate SoS engineers as mandatory 
stakeholders in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
(JCIDS) process for Army acquisitions. 
 
• A Chief Interoperability Officer can be assigned to all future Army 
acquisitions early in the process. This officer will be the authority on all 
interoperability issues, and ensure that interoperability objectives are met in 
the JCIDS process. 
 
• The Army can train personnel in order to make the organizational role of Lead 
System Integrator LSI a government function, or at a minimum oversee 
private companies that assume this role. 
 
• Capability portfolio managers can be assigned at the PEO level, and current 
and future SoS acquisitions can be organized based on the capability 
manager’s area of responsibility as opposed to the program executive officer 
(PEO’s). 
The study concludes by discussing additional research that can be conducted in 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process has changed several times 
over the past fifty years (Fox 2012). According to Fox, it was not until 1960 that the 
DOD actually adopted a formal acquisition strategy. From 1966 to 2001, there have been 
over sixty acquisition reform initiatives attempting to solve the complex issues that are 
characteristic of the DOD acquisition process (Fox 2012). These reforms have led to 
some improvements, but the acquisition process still faces many challenges in balancing 
cost and schedule efficiency while maximizing the capability gained from system 
development. 
During the early 1990s, the acquisition strategy used a threat-based approach 
(Dickerson 2014). Decision makers analyzed current and future threats and developed 
systems designed specifically to counter these threats (Dickerson 2014). Looking at the 
conflicts in which the United States was involved during the 1990s, one can see the 
variety of potential threats the United States had to mitigate. For example, although the 
Cold War was coming to a close in 1990, the Russian threat was not completely 
eliminated. Desert Storm was taking place in the early 1990s, as well as conflicts in 
Bosnia/Kosovo, Somalia, and Afghanistan. As threats evolved, acquisition systems 
became bigger and more complex in order to counter a variety of threats from different 
nations in different environments. Major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs), which 
are programs that exceed a certain cost threshold, became commonplace. These systems’ 
total operating costs typically range from the hundreds of millions to billons, and often 
take years to develop. 
In 2003, the DOD established the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS), which represented a shift in acquisition strategy from threat-based to 
capability-based (Fox 2012). This process replaced the outputs from a requirements-
based analysis—the operational requirements document and mission need statements—
with the initial capability document and capability production document, with output 
based on a capability analysis. The JCIDS process requires sponsors, usually Combatant 
Commanders, to take guidance given in several strategic guidance documents, such as the 
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National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 
National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy (DOD 2015). The Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviews these capabilities, and decides whether 
or not a materiel or non-materiel solution is needed. A materiel solution consists of a 
physical object or objects that form a system. A non-materiel solution consists of a 
change in policy or training that could achieve the capability. If a materiel solution is 
needed, then the defense acquisition process begins. The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates 
the major systems in the acquisition processes. One can see from Figure 1 that all of these 
systems must be integrated effectively in order to produce a successful acquisition. The 
Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) system is responsible for 
planning and tracking programs from a cost perspective. The acquisition process as 
described in Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, deals with the design and build 
of a materiel solution for a particular capability gap, and the JCIDS process identifies and 
prioritizes the capability gaps based on the national defense strategy. 
 
Figure 1.  DOD Procurement Systems (from DOD 2015) 
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Some of the motivations for the shift from a requirements-based process to a 
capability-based acquisition approach can be gleaned from former Secretary of State 
Rumsfeld. In a speech in 2001, Rumsfeld stated that the legacy of acquisition processes is 
“really a relic of the Cold War—a holdover from the days when it was possible to 
forecast threats for the next several decades” (Garamone 2001, 1). In the same speech, 
Rumsfeld noted the need to eliminate redundant processes and capabilities that occur 
when a new system is created every time a new threat emerges. Capability-based 
acquisition also mitigates the tendency to look to a new system for a solution as opposed 
to looking at existing systems for solutions. This new capability approach placed a new 
emphasis on developing SoS. System-of-systems combine individual systems to achieve 
greater capabilities than the individual systems could achieve by themselves (Office of 
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Systems and 
Software Engineering [OSD] 2008).  
The SoS concept came to the forefront in a vision established in the late 1990s, 
described by Charles Dickerson (2014) in his chapter of Systems of Systems Engineering: 
Principles and Applications as a “revolution in military affairs.” This revolution of 
military affairs transitioned from the conventional force-on-force that characterized the 
Cold War era to a networked arms warfare that required agility and flexibility. According 
to Dickerson, the rise of the Internet during this time led to senior leaders envisioning a 
battlespace in which hardware and software systems could be integrated across multiple 
platforms. The benefits of this approach would be increased situational awareness, faster 
communications, and quicker and more precise execution. Additionally, network-based 
acquisition approach would facilitate joint operations, which have become commonplace 
in military operations. In the Army, specifically, leaders envisioned commanders being 
able to track their assets on the battlefield through software (Dickerson 2014).  By the 
early 21st century, the Army shifted from platform-based to network-based operations 
(Dickerson 2014). The structure for using SoS to achieve this network-centric concept 
can be seen in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Comparison of Platform Centric Systems Architecture with 
Network-Centric Systems Architecture (from Dickerson 2014) 
On the left side of the diagram in Figure 2, there are three weapon platforms, each 
with its own battlespace. In this case, the network connectivity of each platform does not 
extend outside of the particular weapons battlespace, and there is no connectivity 
between weapon platforms. On the right side, the diagram describes a networked systems 
architecture in which all weapon platforms are connected and integrated into a single 
battlespace. This illustrates the potential of a networked system of systems. When the 
Army moved toward a network-centric approach, the increased connectivity also added 
complexity to systems and SoS. With this rise in system complexity, there was a renewed 
emphasis on the systems engineering process, which facilitated the creation of many 
individual systems. By 2009, there were ninety-six individual DOD MDAPs that were in 
various phases of the acquisition process (Fox 2012). The current systems engineering 
process for individual systems can be seen in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Individual Systems Engineering Process for Acquisitions (from 
Manning 2014) 
As seen in Figure 3, the systems engineering process starts with an operational 
need and ends with a delivered capability. The technical processes going up and down the 
V are described in the adjacent boxes, and the technical management processes are used 
throughout the systems engineering process. 
Over the past five years, the DOD has made an effort to incorporate system of 
systems engineering into the acquisition process. Evidence of this can be seen with the 
DOD SoS Guidebook published in 2008 (OSD 2008) and the Navy’s draft SoS 
Engineering Guidebook released in 2011 (Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research, Development, Acquisition) [OASN (RDA)] 2006). The intent of incorporating 
SoS engineering would be to explore the idea of integrating existing systems, as opposed 
to creating new systems to fill capability gaps. Currently, the Army does not have a 
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service-specific guide for SoS engineering. This thesis explores taking a deliberate effort 
to integrate existing and future Army programs into a system of systems. This would 
align with the Army’s plan according to the Army Acquisition Policy, AR 70-1, which is 
to approach all materiel acquisitions from an SoS perspective (Department of the Army 
2011). It further discusses organizational changes that would have to take place in order 
to facilitate such an effort. 
A. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to examine the acquisition process from an SoS 
perspective and identify lessons learned and best practices from past Army attempts to 
implement SoS. Additionally, this research looks at current SoS engineering processes 
and organizational changes that must take place in order for the Army to successfully 
integrate its existing programs into an SoS. The goal of this thesis is to provide a starting 
point for a possible cultural shift away from the individual system approach to an SoS 
approach for addressing capability gaps. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem that the Army is currently experiencing is that although several 
Army systems are integrated at some level, the Army acquisition policies and procedures 
are structured based on addressing capability gaps using an individual system approach. 
This is evidenced by the focus on individual systems in Army acquisition regulations 
(such as the AR 70-1) and guidelines (such as the Department of the Army Pamphlet 70-
3 [DA PAM 70-3]). These individual systems are becoming more complex, requiring 
more resources, and several have been cancelled due to cost or schedule overruns. 
Although the systems engineering process is commonplace for individual system 
acquisition, systems engineering for SoS rarely takes place, if it takes place at all. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the systems engineering for SoS is not explicitly addressed in 
Army acquisition regulations. This thesis addresses the need for the Army’s next major 
program to make a deliberate effort to implement the systems engineering process for 
SoS, and the organizational changes that must take place in order for the Army to 
effectively implement systems engineering for SoS. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer the following questions in order to recommend 
process and organizational changes to the current acquisition system that facilitate an SoS 
approach to current and future Army programs: 
1. What are some of the lessons learned and best practices that can be 
gleaned from the Army’s past attempts at SoS acquisitions? 
2. What current processes in the Army acquisition system should change, be 
created, or be implemented as policy in order to facilitate systems 
engineering from an SoS perspective? 
3. What organizational changes in the Army need to take place to facilitate a 
successful SoS engineering process? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis is intended to apply to all current and future Army acquisition 
programs; however, this thesis will focus on three previous SoS acquisitions as case 
studies to recommend process and organizational changes to the acquisition system. Due 
to the extensive number of Army programs, the research does not detail how particular 
Army programs could be integrated into an SoS architecture, but it does focus on lessons 
learned and best practices to set the conditions for all current and future programs to be 
integrated into an SoS architecture. Additionally, this thesis examines the organizations 
involved in the primary steps of the acquisition process and recommends changes to 
facilitate the systems engineering process from an SoS perspective. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis discusses some of the policy and doctrinal changes that led to the 
acquisition of SoSs.  It then defines different SoS types and details the core elements of 
SoS engineering. This thesis also details the steps of the acquisition process and the 
personnel and processes involved. The research uses the seven core elements of SoS as 
described in the DOD SE guide for SoS (OSD 2008) as a framework to analyze past 
Army SoS programs and determine what was done successfully as well as areas for 
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improvement. The report concludes with procedural and organizational recommendations 
for implementing an SoS engineering approach to current and future Army acquisitions.  
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II of this thesis is a literature review, which focuses on the Army SoS and 
its role in the acquisition process; it concludes with a discussion of the core elements of 
SoS engineering. Chapter III analyzes three past Army SoS programs using core elements 
of SoS engineering as described in the DOD SE guide. The chapter concludes with 
lessons learned, which are used to recommend process and organizational changes in the 
following chapters. Chapter IV looks at the major processes of the acquisition process, 
and discusses process changes or additions needed in order to facilitate the systems 
engineering process for SoS. Chapter V examines the organizations involved in the 
acquisition process and recommends changes to facilitate the system engineering process 
for SoS. Chapter VI concludes with a summary of recommendations and areas for future 
research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to go forward with the analysis of SoS and realize how it relates to the 
Army acquisition process, it is important to understand certain definitions and processes 
that are relevant to SoS during the acquisition process. The DOD defines a system as a 
“functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or 
interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole” (OSD 2008, 
3). An SoS is “a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful 
systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities” (OSD 2008, 
4). According to the SoS SE guide’s definitions of a system and an SoS, the distinction 
between the two is that once a system is established and is broken down into its 
components, the components cannot be the same (OSD 2008). An example of this can be 
seen with a car.  Once the engine and doors and wheels are separated from the car, the 
components cannot perform the same functions that they could as part of the total car 
system. On the other hand, with an SoS, individual systems can theoretically break away 
from the SoS and provide useful capabilities. An example of this is two systems 
connected by a network, such as iCloud.  Both a smart phone and computer can share 
data through an iCloud but each system can also function independently. The flexibility 
inherent in an SoS is an important concept because it allows some flexibility with 
individual systems. The constituent systems of an SoS can be attached and detached from 
without losing their individual system identity. 
An SoS is different from a family of systems. A family of systems is “a set of 
systems that provide similar capabilities through different approaches to achieve similar 
or complementary effects” (OSD 2008, 4). The distinction here lies in the capability. For 
example, the Stryker and the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) 
would be considered a family of systems because they both provide similar capabilities. 
Both are used as methods of transportation for soldiers, and both vehicles have the 
capability to mount weapon systems for security. The Stryker has a greater personnel 
capacity and the armament is better than the HMMWV, but the combination of both of 
these vehicles does not provide any unique capabilities. On the other hand, the Ballistic 
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Missile Defense System is a true SoS because the Air Force’s Upgraded Early Warning 
Radar (UEWR) combined with a Patriot System provides unique capabilities unavailable 
from the constituent systems. The UEWR can detect missiles early in the incoming 
missiles flight and can cue the incoming missile with the Patriot System so that the 
Patriot can engage the missile at the optimal time. The UEWR alone cannot intercept any 
missiles, but it has a great range for missile detection. The Patriot System radar can detect 
missiles, but it does not have the sensor range of the UEWR. These two systems 
combined as well as several other systems in the ballistic missile defense SoS come 
together to provide greater capabilities against missile threats. 
An SoS, such as the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), comes into 
existence under different circumstances. These circumstances can be categorized into one 















Table 1.   Categories of SoS (from MITRE 2014) 
Type Definition 
Virtual 
Virtual SoSs lack a central management authority and a centrally 
agreed-upon-purpose for the system-of-systems. Large-scale 
behavior emerges—and may be desirable—but this type of SoS must 
rely on relatively invisible mechanisms to maintain it. 
Collaborative 
In collaborative SoSs, the component systems interact more or less 
voluntarily to fulfill agreed upon central purposes. The Internet is a 
collaborative system. The Internet Engineering Task Force works 
out standards but has no power to enforce them. The central players 
collectively decide how to provide or deny service, thereby 
providing some means of enforcing and maintaining standards. 
Acknowledged 
Acknowledged SoSs have recognized objectives, a designated 
manager, and resources. However, the constituent systems retain 
their independent ownership, objectives, funding, development, and 
sustainment approaches. Changes in the systems are based on 
collaboration between the SoS and the system. 
Directed 
Directed SoSs are those in which the integrated system-of-systems is 
built and managed to fulfill specific purposes. It is centrally 
managed during long-term operation to continue to fulfill those 
purposes as well as any new ones the system owners might wish to 
address. The component systems maintain an ability to operate 
independently, but their normal operational mode is subordinated to 
the central managed purpose. 
 
An example of a virtual SoS is the DOW Jones Industrial. Shareholders and CEOs 
have some level of control over the individual companies or systems that make up the 
DOW, but there is no central authority that manages the DOW as a whole. Financial 
capital, which often is fueled by consumer confidence, is the mechanism that maintains 
the DOW. It is relatively invisible because individual investors will buy and sell the stock 
based on their personal beliefs about a particular company. One can only speculate the 
reasons why the DOW may go up or down. 
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One property that is especially prevalent in a virtual SoS is emergence. 
Emergence, as stated by Charles Keating, occurs when “patterns/properties in a complex 
system will come about (emerge) through operation of the system. These 
patterns/properties cannot be anticipated beforehand and are not capable of being 
deduced from understanding of system constituents or their individual properties” 
(Keating 2014, 170). Emergence occurs in systems and SoS. In a virtual SoS, there is 
little to no planning for emergence, so with the example of the DOW, there are numerous 
trades taking place during the day by millions of people. This could cause the DOW to 
rise significantly. This may lead to emergent behavior such as investors believing that the 
DOW is overvalued and consequently beginning to sell, or it could cause companies to 
make a business decision based on the DOWs perceived value that reverses the upward 
trend. These emergent behaviors can produce both positive and negative consequences.  
The Internet, as stated in Table 1, is a collaborative SoS. Information comes from 
many different sources, but can be monitored, and, if necessary, censored by federal 
authorities. Several nations around the world censor information available on the Internet, 
usually through their government. In this regard the Internet is a collaborative SoS 
because each nation has its own way of monitoring and regulating the information that is 
seen on websites. Additionally, various websites come together to provide diverse 
information on a myriad of topics. Different nations have different standards, and 
although each nation is able to centrally manage information in their respective nations, 
there is no global authority that controls what is posted on the Internet. In this sense, the 
Internet is virtual, with no central authority and no central agreement on the purpose of 
the Internet. 
Acknowledged and Directed SoSs are more commonplace in the DOD. An 
example of an acknowledged SoS is the BMDS. All systems in the ballistic missile 
defense system come together to combat a common threat of intercepting ballistic and 
cruise missiles launched by land, sea, or air. Each system within the BMDS is managed 
separately and has its own line of funding. For example, the Terminal High Altitude 
Defense (THAAD) system is managed by the Army while the Aegis system is managed 
by the Navy. The BMDS SoS is managed by the missile defense agency (MDA). The 
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MDA is primarily responsible for integrating these individual systems. According to the 
DOD systems engineering guide, “most military systems are part of an SOS even if they 
are not explicitly recognized as such” (OSD 2008, 4). This suggests that most DOD SoSs 
are acknowledged as opposed to directed. Although the ballistic missile defense system is 
an acknowledged SoS, the missile defense agency does not explicitly state that BMDS is 
an SoS. It refers to BMDS as “the system” on its webpage, and the individual systems as 
“elements” (Missile Defense Agency 2014). The term elements suggest that each part of 
the BMDS is not a system in itself. This is characteristic of several Army programs. 
These programs are acknowledged as an SoS, though a lot of the terminology and 
processes resemble a system. 
The last category of SoS is the directed SoS. The most recent example of an 
Army-directed SoS is the Army Future Combat Systems (FCS). This is the most 
significant attempt at an Army SoS. This was a first for the Army, and the Army has not 
attempted to design and build a directed SoS since the FCS. The FCS was initiated in 
2003 with the intention of transforming the Army into a lighter, more agile force. This 
program was intended to function as an SoS, and was centrally managed by high-ranking 
Army and civilian personnel. According to a RAND study, this was the “most ambitious 
acquisition program in Army history” (Pernin et al 2012, iii). The program was cancelled 
in 2009 for a variety of reasons. An in-depth analysis of the decisions and processes 
followed during the acquisition of the FCS occurs in subsequent chapters.  
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING IN SOS 
Most of the processes that occur throughout any system’s lifecycle are influenced 
by the systems engineering process. The systems engineering process grew out of a need 
to analyze programs holistically. It can be traced back to the 1960s, when Secretary 
McNamara and his staff through the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 created the Office 
of Systems Analysis (Fox 2012). This was in response to several cost and schedule 
overruns that occurred in programs such as the C-5A, the F-111, and the SRAM-A (Fox 
2012). The Systems engineering process continued to develop in later decades, and 
became a discipline in several universities by the late 1990s. Currently, the systems 
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engineering process is mandated in the Army Acquisition Policy, AR 70-1. The policy 
states, “Regardless of the acquisition category, all programs shall develop and follow a 
systems engineering plan to execute and manage a disciplined systems engineering 
process supporting the acquisition strategy adopted by the program” (Department of the 
Army 2011, 41). Therefore, it is logical that systems engineering processes would play a 
significant role in SoS as well. Although the Army specifically mandates that a systems 
engineering process must be implemented throughout the entire life cycle of the system, 
there is no mention of an SoS engineering process to guide the SoS acquisition process. 
Systems engineering for a system and an SoS is very different. The chart in Table 2 






















Based on the table, some of the key differences in the systems engineering 
processes deal with management. The systems engineering process frequently deals with 
gathering information from stakeholders and addressing their perspectives in the system. 
While a system may have stakeholders with multiple perspectives, stakeholders are all 
focused on the system, whereas in the SoS environment, stakeholders may or may not be 
vested in the SoS, and each stakeholder perspective may represent a different system. 
Another aspect of systems engineering is the relationship between the systems engineer 
and the program manager. Systems generally are assigned one program manager (PM), 
and in an SoS there usually is an SoS manager that must coordinate with several PMs. 
The relationship between the systems engineer and the SoS manager is different from the 
relationship between a systems engineer and project manager because the SoS manager 
has limited influence on the individual systems, whereas the program manager usually 
has influence over the system subcomponents. 
Systems engineering is also focused on testing. The chart in Table 2 describes 
how testing is more difficult for an SoS because different systems may be in different 
development stages, which usually precludes testing the entire SoS. Consequently, testing 
rarely occurs at the SoS level. The constituent systems that make up the SoS usually are 
tested without the benefit of integration testing. The lack of integration testing places the 
SoS at risk of operational failure when the SoS is fielded for operational use. 
Furthermore, the systems engineering process focuses on establishing boundaries so that 
the system has the proper scope. This is challenging when dealing with SoS because 
systems are coming in with established boundaries, and changing these boundaries to 
accommodate an SoS may not align with the stakeholders’ intended use for the individual 
system. Based on the differences between systems engineering and SoS engineering, it is 
important for the Army to emphasize these differences in Army acquisition policy. The 
systems engineering guide for the DOD discusses core elements of SoS engineering. 




Figure 4.  SoS Core Elements and Their Relationships (from OSD 2008) 
B. CORE ELEMENTS OF SOS ENGINEERING 
These seven core elements are described in detail in the SoS System Engineering 
(SE) Guidebook (OSD 2008), and will serve as the analytical framework for Army SoS 
programs in later chapters. The seven elements are discussed briefly in the following 
section. 
(1) Translating Capability Objectives 
An important part of the acquisition process is taking the capability objectives 
established during the JCIDS process and translating them to a materiel solution, if 
required. Capability objectives for an SoS are often very broad in nature (OSD 2008), and 
must be refined during the SoS SE acquisition process in order to accurately portray the 
way each constituent system will work together to achieve the desired capabilities. An 
example of a broad capability is to facilitate data transfer between multiple platforms. 
This capability must be refined to describe the interoperable capability that each platform 
must have, and the type of data each system must be capable of transferring. 
Furthermore, the SoS manager must be able to articulate what part each system will play 
in providing the overall capability required. This is often easier to glean from a functional 
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decomposition of a single system. In an SoS, there will be a functional decomposition of 
all the constituent systems, and possibly an additional functional decomposition that 
traces the functions of the constituent systems with the overall capability objectives. 
Although the SoS SE guide states that SoS engineers operate under the assumption that 
all constituent systems go through the systems engineering process, the SoS Systems 
engineer will at a minimum have to understand the way each system’s functions 
contribute to the overall objective. This understanding is necessary to facilitate a 
capability to requirements crosswalk that is essential in systems engineering. 
(2) Understanding System Relationships  
If the SoS manager or engineer does not understand the relationships between the 
subordinate systems, the SoS will be at risk of not meeting capability requirements, or 
risk significant cost and schedule overruns. In essence, the SoS will likely fail in the long 
run if relationships between systems are not understood. Understanding system 
relationships goes beyond how the physical components are related and how they 
interface. Understanding system relationships means understanding the boundaries and 
constraints of each system (OSD 2008). These could be cost and schedule constraints or 
constraints imposed by political figures. The challenges associated with administrative 
relationships could be more difficult to overcome than the challenges stemming from 
physical component relationships. This does not mean that the physical component 
relationships should be ignored. Software and networking are a growing part of the 
acquisition process. An SoS engineer must understand the interface requirements for each 
subordinate system in order to assess technological and financial risks associated with 
SoS integration. The SoS engineer must also be mindful of how these relationships will 
change over time when one individual system retires or upgrades. 
(3) Assessing Performance to Capability Objectives  
In systems engineering, capabilities are usually mapped to functions, and 
functions are assessed based on measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. 
Measures of performance for an SoS may conflict with measures of performance of a 
constituent system. An individual system may have to perform sub-optimally in order for 
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the SoS to perform optimally (OSD 2008). For example, a sensor on a particular weapon 
system may function optimally when its sensor is actively searching; however, when the 
weapon system operates in an SoS, the weapon system may cause interference for 
another sensor with greater detection range. This may require that the first system turn off 
its sensor and depend on the second system to do target searching. In this case, the first 
system is not in its optimal state, but it still has a weapon system that will make the SoS 
function optimally with assistance from the second system’s sensor.  
The assessment of a function’s ability to meet its objectives is usually solidified 
through operational testing of the system (OSD 2008). This becomes more challenging 
when dealing with SoS. In order to conduct an operational test on an SoS, all of the 
individual systems must be at a point where they can be operationally tested. This means 
that coordination between the SoS manager and the subordinate systems is essential in 
order to facilitate operational testing. Oftentimes, operational testing before fielding is 
not feasible based on the constraints of the subordinate systems. As a result, most SoS 
testing is done through simulation (OSD 2008). There are always limitations when 
dealing with simulations because certain assumptions must be made. Further, these 
assumptions in simulation can result in a limited ability to capture the emergence that 
occurs when actual systems interface with each other. It is therefore important to 
understand and articulate the risk associated with the data that comes from simulation 
testing on an SoS. If possible, the actual systems should be used to conduct operational 
testing. This will yield the most accurate results, and possibly be a good investment that 
mitigates the cost incurred from employing a system based on inaccurate data. 
(4) Developing and Evolving SoS Architecture 
The Department of Defense architecture views (DODAF) provide guidelines on 
ways to display the architecture for systems and SoS. The SoS SE guide states that 
requirements often evolve from architectural views and architectural views evolve from 
requirements. Important architectural views for an SoS must address the relationships 
between constituent systems (OSD 2008).  This can be done with a high-level operational 
concept graphic (OV-1) that details the concept of operations for the SoS. Viewing the 
system from an operational perspective allows stakeholders to see how the system 
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achieves its required capabilities. There are several other SoS architectural views in 
DODAF that can be utilized based on the requirements of the specific SoS. In addition to 
developing the baseline architecture, SoS architecture must evolve to accommodate the 
dynamic nature of an SoS. SoS architecture should account for changes in individual 
systems. For example, if a system upgrades its software, interface views should be 
updated to reflect the software upgrade’s impact on the SoS. This holds true for a system 
that may be retired as well, as this will certainly have an impact on the SoS. 
(5) Monitoring and Assessing Changes 
It is important to keep track of changes in the constituent systems because they 
may have an effect on the SoS. For example, an upgrade on the software of a particular 
system could affect the interoperability between that system and other systems. Similarly, 
changes in physical components also must be accounted for, as they may affect physical 
connections between other systems. It is important that these changes are planned in 
advance so that the effects on the SoS can be assessed. In addition to technical changes to 
the systems, there are changes to the programs.  SoS managers must be cognizant of any 
changes in funding for constituent systems. For example, in the event of a sequestration 
where several budgets are cut, the SoS manager must understand the implications of the 
funding changes and how the funding limitations impact SoS performance.  
It is important for SoS managers to document configuration changes in individual 
systems in case changes degrade SoS performance (OSD 2008). The SoS may need to go 
back to a baseline configuration if interoperability issues arise from physical or software 
upgrades in constituent systems. This would not be possible without a robust 
configuration management plan with detailed documentation. SoS may have to 
accommodate changes in subordinate systems, so this may warrant a bottom-up analysis 
to determine the effect of a constituent system change on the SoS. 
(6) Addressing Requirements and Solution Options  
In systems engineering, the analysis of alternatives focuses on system components 
and how they will best achieve the required capabilities given the system constraints 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2010).  This becomes more challenging when dealing with an 
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SoS, because trade-offs in an SoS often involve concessions from individual systems that 
have already gone through an analysis of alternatives to bring their systems into existence 
(OSD 2008). The trade-offs in the systems engineering process for a system can often be 
balanced with cost efficiency and its ability to achieve a desired measure of performance. 
SoS trade-offs could potentially be more complicated, as certain trade-offs may be made 
just to get constituent systems to buy in to the SoS. Extensive negotiations must take 
place so that each individual system’s stakeholder feels comfortable with its role in the 
SoS (OSD 2008). In a directed SoS, this could take years, because each individual system 
would have to go through its own analysis of alternatives, followed by an analysis of 
alternatives for the SoS.  
(7) Orchestrating SoS Upgrades  
The difference between a system upgrade and an SoS upgrade can be seen by 
comparing the upgrade in software that occurred on the Patriot System to go from PAC-2 
to PAC-3 missiles as opposed to a software upgrade for the complete BMDS. Because 
SoS upgrades are very large undertakings, the SoS Engineering Guide advocates 
upgrading in increments (OSD 2008).  Orchestrating SoS upgrades must take all of the 
other six core elements into consideration in order to be executed successfully. A system 
mapping to capability requirements should be carefully planned, resourced, and modeled 
to ensure that the SoS upgrade is executed in the most efficient manner that maximizes 
performance.  
The SoS systems engineering process is depicted in Figure 5. Notable in this 
diagram is that the SoS process assumes that each individual system acquisition is 
executed using the systems engineering process (OSD 2008). 
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Figure 5.  SoS Engineering Processes (from OSD 2008) 
The following chapters discuss past and present Army programs through the lens 
of these core elements to determine the best practices for an SoS approach to all existing 
and future Army programs as well as if implemented, how the SoS approach should be 
executed. 
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III. ARMY SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
This chapter will examine three case studies of previous Army SoS acquisitions, 
the Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar System (C-RAM), the Army Battle Command 
System (ABCS), and the Future Combat System (FCS).  Using the core elements from 
SoS engineering, lessons learned will be obtained in order to make recommendations for 
process and organizational changes for current and future Army SoS acquisitions. 
A. COUNTER ROCKET ARTILLERY MORTAR SYSTEM 
The C-RAM is an SoS built-in response to the indirect fire that was impacting 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The SoS was built in 2004 based on an Operational 
Need Statement from Multinational Forces in Iraq. Leaders expressed a need for early 
identification and destruction of incoming mortars in order to reduce the adverse effects 
of operations in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) (Whaley and Stewart 2014). The C-
RAM was built largely from existing systems from different Army branches as well as 
different services. The Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) is 
the main command and control system for the C-RAM. It uses hardware and software to 
provide an air picture for the operator (Program Executive Officer Missiles & Space—
Anywhere—All the Time [PEO] 2015). It is used by divisional or short range air defense 
units to support the Army air defense mission by providing an air picture to complement 
other Army air defense systems, such as Patriot and THAAD. The C-RAM also uses the 
Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System (AMDPCS) that provides an air 
picture for all echelons of air defense, the Air and Missile Defense Workstation 
(AMDWS) that initially was created as the Command and Control center for PATRIOT, 
Systems. The C-RAM provides an air picture for short range ballistic weapons, and also 
can simulate engagements on the battlefield based on a threat profile and friendly 
capabilities (PEO 2015). The C-RAM SoS also has early warning and cueing capabilities. 
These cueing capabilities are provided by a wireless system called Warn, which uses 
wireless technology to integrate with existing security systems and provide audio and 
visual warning in the AOR. The radar that provides the air picture for the C-RAM is the 
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AN/TPQ 36 and 37 radars (PEO 2015). These radars initially were created to support the 
field artillery mission of detecting short- and long-range rockets and mortars. They 
currently provide detection capability for the C-RAM (Higgins 2007). The weapon 
system for the C-RAM is a version almost identical to the Navy MK 15 Phalanx close-in 
weapon system (CWIS) used as the final layer of defense for ships. Adjustments had to 
be made to convert the ship-based platform into a land-based platform (PEO 2015). The 
diagram in Figure 7 illustrates the SoS architecture for the C-RAM. 
 
Figure 6.  C-RAM SoS Architecture (from Bloodsworth 2010) 
(1) Acquisition Process 
One of the notable accomplishments about the C-RAM project was that it took 
less than fifteen months to go from operational need to an initial operating system 
(Archer 2014). The unclassified C-RAM performance ranges from a 60–70 percent 
probability of intercept against incoming mortars (Global Security 2015). In addition, 
during OIF, the C-RAM provided early warning for over 1,500 incoming rounds (Army 
C-RAM Intercepts 100th Mortar Bomb in Iraq 2009). Archer states the “C-RAM 
 25 
leveraged existing technologies within the DOD and private sector to curtail the typical 
system-of-systems acquisition timeframe of 10–20 years” (2014, 32). Using the core 
elements of SE SoS, the thesis examines the C-RAM acquisition process in the next 
section. 
(2) Translating Capability Objectives 
Translating capability objectives must start with a broad need statement especially 
for SoS. The C-RAM is in the category of an acknowledged SoS. The Operational Need 
Statement called for “an indirect-fire intercept capability” (Corbett 2012, 47) during 
Operation Iraqi freedom. The need statement meets the criteria for a broad SoS capability 
need because it is general enough to facilitate an analysis of alternatives and also 
effectively describes the need for personnel in theater. The fact that the threat was 
immediate, instead of the forecasted threats that usually drive the acquisition process, 
provided context for the designers and builders to create a system to meet the users’ 
needs.  
(3) Understanding Systems and Relationships 
The C-RAM consists of the land-based Phalanx weapon system for intercept 
purposes, the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) and Air and 
Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS) for command and control functions. The 
Lightweight Counter Mortar and Firefinder radars from the Field Artillery branch were 
used as sensors, and the Warn system used for early warning. One of the strengths of the 
C-RAM acquisition process was the ability to understand systems and relationships. One 
of the reasons for this is that the C-RAM started with a Joint Urgent Operational Needs 
Statement (JUONS). The JUONS was created in 2004 to facilitate a more streamlined 
acquisition process to counter urgent threats. The JUONS ensured that multiple 
perspectives examined these needs (Whaley and Stewart 2014). 
Another demonstration of the decision authority demonstrating an understanding 
of systems and relationships in the C-RAM was their ability to decompose the problem 
statement effectively. This was evident in the way C-RAM acquisition was task 
organized. For example, the Field Artillery branch of the U.S. Army was the first branch 
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involved with the C-RAM because the Field Artillery already had systems with the 
ability to detect short- and long-range mortars. Although the field artillery could identify 
mortar locations, they did not have C2 systems capable of simultaneously providing 
intelligence, and maintain a common operating air picture in a joint environment. 
(Higgins 2007). This is where the Army Air Defense came into play. The decision 
makers demonstrated understanding that the FAAD C2 and AMDWS provided the C2 
needed for the C-RAMs operational environment. The decision maker understood that 
that neither the Air Defense nor Field artillery had the offensive capability to intercept 
incoming mortars. This led to the inclusion of the land-based Phalanx weapon system that 
was used in the Navy at sea. The Navy demonstrated the capability to defend against 
incoming mortars with the CWIS, so it made sense to utilize the Navy’s experience in 
developing an intercept capability for the C-RAM (PEO 2015). The warning capability 
was given to contractors. Clearly, decision makers understood the relationships between 
the C-RAM constituent systems, and demonstrated a great understanding of the C-RAMs 
operational requirements to effectively decompose the problem to incorporate existing 
systems from different branches of the Army and Navy. 
(4) Assessing Performance to Capability Objectives 
Assessing the performance to capability objectives usually happens during 
operational testing. All of the subordinate systems were available to conduct a full 
operational test during the C-RAM acquisition. This is a rare occurrence in SoS because, 
as described in Chapter II of this study, testing all constituent systems simultaneously is 
challenging. Testing systems individually is different from testing the SoS because 
interoperability testing is a significant undertaking for an SoS. Assessing the performance 
to capability objectives for this SoS was relatively straightforward in part because the 
need statement was clearly defined. Additionally, similar capability objectives are 
required for the tracking, detection, and interception of any incoming target, and the 
DOD had extensive experience meeting these objectives from prior air and missile 
defense systems. Operational testing was conducted in Yuma, AZ, by an Air Defense 
unit. The C-RAM SoS represented systems from different branches of the military, but 
the users and testers were all in the Air Defense branch. A critical part of operational 
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testing is for users with contextual knowledge of the system to provide feedback on 
system performance. Given that the concept of joint operations was still relatively new to 
the DOD, there was little initial effort to involve other branches and services in the 
operational testing. As a result, an assessment of performance to capability objectives 
was successful but could have been enhanced if more effort was placed on incorporating 
users from different branches of the Army. 
(5) Developing and Evolving an SoS Architecture 
The development of the initial SoS architecture was facilitated through the close 
relationship with acquisition decision-makers and the Army testing agency. C-RAM did 
not introduce any new capabilities without going through Army Test and Evaluation 
Command (ATEC). Effective communication between the PMs also facilitated an 
evolving architecture for the C-RAM. Although it was developed in a short period of 
time, the changes that occurred were smooth due to the communication between PMs and 
communication with the testing agency. During a test and evaluation (T&E) briefing, 
Bloodsworth (2009) states that, “Multiple changes were required in the C-RAM’s 
program of record (POR) component system; All such changes were agreed to between 
the C-RAM and POR PMs” (11). This statement speaks to the ability of C-RAM 
stakeholders to develop and evolve the existing SoS architecture. 
Along with developing an SoS architecture, it is always important to have a good 
understanding of the concept of operations. Although the C-RAM was effective in OIF, 
there were issues with the collateral damage risks that occurred when using the system 
operationally. It is likely that these issues may have been avoided if a thorough concept 
of operations was generated prior to the C-RAMs deployment. In a general sense, 
operators deployed knowing their mission was to warn, detect, and intercept incoming 
mortars; however, extensive analysis on the effects of deploying the system to theater did 
not occur. One of the characteristics of the C-RAM is that it fires many rounds at a single 
mortar. In a counterinsurgency environment where one of the main goals is to protect the 
civilian population, protecting civilians is challenging when the C-RAM is firing 180–
200 rounds at a mortar. In theory, the shells that do not engage the mortar are supposed to 
self-destruct in the air; however, there is always a chance that shrapnel from the mortars 
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will endanger civilians. As stated in Higgins’ study, “At the tactical level, the clearing of 
fires before the gun could engage a hostile round resulted in failed interceptions” (2007, 
27). The failed interceptions were a result of the Army not receiving clearance in time to 
fire at the incoming mortars. This collateral damage issue might have been understood in 
greater detail if a through concept of operations had been in place. A thorough concept of 
operations is needed in order for the system architecture to evolve with changing 
environments.  
(6) Monitoring and Assessing Changes 
The C-RAM subordinate systems have had several changes to the sensor, 
command and control, and intercept systems (Corbett 2012). These changes were mostly 
software changes that did not have a detrimental effect on interoperability for the C-RAM 
system. However, training for personnel that were manning the system was difficult 
because operators could not keep up with developments in the individual systems 
(Corbett 2012). Army short-range air defense units took on the majority of responsibility 
for the C-RAM mission. Keeping up to date on systems outside of the Air Defense 
specific systems proved to be challenging. Personnel were not familiar with software 
upgrades and had difficulty acquiring necessary parts for the system. These challenges 
are described in the air defense and field artillery Fires bulletin, which states, “Logistics 
for the C-RAM program has grown in fits and starts along the materiel domain path 
where, initially it was not keeping pace with the rapid, spiral development of the sensor, 
shooter, and command and control equipment in the acquisition process” (Corbett 2012, 
53). This speaks to the logistical challenges that existed during subordinate systems’ 
evolution. A mitigation that is currently in place is the transforming of two short-range 
Air Defense units completely into C-RAM units. This transformation will facilitate 
training and build training depth for the C-RAM system. The transformation will also 
help with the logistical challenges, because dedicated users will be continuously 




(7) Addressing Requirements and Solution Options 
The C-RAM system addresses the total threat of incoming mortars by providing 
early detection, tracking ability, and intercept capability. As a result, the C-RAM system 
is flexible enough to address a number of requirements in varying operational 
environments. The stakeholders’ ability to understand the requirements led to solutions 
that met the operational needs of the system. As pointed out previously, there were issues 
with the CONOPS initially because intercepting mortars requires air and ground 
clearance, which is not always practical, especially in urban environments. However, the 
flexibility of the SoS found workable solutions to the CONOPS issue. For example, 
several Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) use part of the C-RAM strictly for its early 
warning capability. This capability allows personnel time to find cover during an 
incoming indirect fire attack. Future iterations involve replacing the Phalanx with a high 
energy laser to reduce or eliminate the requirement for ground clearance. Short-term 
developments for the C-RAM focus on addressing performance requirements and 
solutions through software changes, and increasing the intercept systems probability of 
kill. In the meantime, the flexibility of the C-RAM in its current state allows the system 
to provide adequate solutions in a variety of operational environments. 
(8) Orchestrating Upgrades to SoS 
One of the challenges of the C-RAM SoS has to do with the funding of the SoS. 
Each independent system has its own program, which means that each system has its own 
line of funding or POR (Whaley and Stewart 2014). One of the most significant upgrades 
proposed for the C-RAM system is upgrading the intercept system from a shell- and 
missile-based system to a laser-based system. This will improve accuracy and reduce the 
threat the current system has on personnel, especially in populated areas. Funding still 
has to be captured in order to responsibly manage the upgrades. As Archer states, “It is 
difficult to quantify the amount of funding that has been directed to the C-RAM program. 
Funding has come from multiple budgets” (2012, 33). The establishment of a program 
director responsible for the SoS, as well as the constituent systems, is currently leading 
efforts to codify the funding for the C-RAM program. 
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B. ARMY BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM 
The Army Battle Command System (ABCS) is an SoS designed to consolidate the 
U.S. Army’s command and control platforms. In addition, ABCS facilitates the decision-
maker’s ability to execute command and control responsibilities, such as planning 
operations orders, disseminating information, and assessing situations. ABCS facilitates 
bottom-up feedback as well. This can all be done without individuals being physically 
located at the same place. The constituent systems that make up the SoS are as follows: 
 
• Global Command and Control System (GCCS): The GCCS system is the link 
between Army tactical units and the joint environment. It provides the 
common operating picture link to joint platform (ABCS Smart book 2001). 
 
• Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A): The DCGS-A is a 
comprehensive intelligence information source for the Army and joint force. It 
provides surveillance, a variety of map overlays with imagery, and terrain 
analysis. It also provides access to open source material on the Internet 
(Department of the Army 2009). Other systems in the ABCS that provide 
intelligence data are the digital topographic support system and the integrated 
meteorological system. 
 
• Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3): The BCS3 is used by 
logisticians to provide real-time logistical information and facilitates the 
supply chain process with a common operating picture for logistics at 
different operational levels. (Department of the Army 2009). 
 
• Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS): The TAIS provides situational 
awareness for airspace controllers at different levels. It also facilitates the 
deconfliction of civilian and military assets, and provides a common operating 
picture for Army aviation assets and joint military assets in the airspace 
(Department of the Army 2009). 
 
• Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS) and the Advanced Field 
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS): These systems are the C2 nodes 
for the Air Defense and Field Artillery branches, respectively (Department of 
the Army 2009). 
 
• Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2): The FBCB2 is the 
main C2 platform for Army units Brigade level and below. It provides 
friendly unit locations and facilitates the dissemination of operations orders. It 
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is the link between the brigade units and the higher headquarters (Department 
of the Army 2009). 
 
• Battle Command Common Services (BCCS): This is the server that links the 
constituent systems of the ABCS and provides interoperability (Department of 
the Army 2009). 
 
The diagram in Figure 7 depicts the ABCS and its constituent systems. 
 
Figure 7.  Army Battle Command Systems Architecture (from DOT&E 2001) 
(1) Acquisition Process 
Similar to the C-RAM, the ABCS was built using existing systems. It also was an 
acknowledged SoS because the platforms were already fielded. One major difference in 
the acquisition process was that the ABCS process evolved from an operational 
requirements document developed in 1995 (Department of the Army 1994). However, the 
ABCS was not fielded as an SoS until 2005. Prior to this period, the ABCS term was 
used to refer to the collection of systems but lacked the integration of an SoS. The 
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operations requirements document was part of the Army digitization plan created in 1995 
(Department of the Army 1994). The Army digitization plan included the ABCS common 
operating environment/common applications requirements document (Department of the 
Army 1994). This document called for the “migration of current separate Army command 
and control component systems into one integrated system” (Department of the Army 
1994, 3). It called for not only vertical integration, which would go from the higher 
headquarters down to the lowest level, but also horizontal integration, which allowed 
everyone in the network to see the commands instantaneously (Department of the Army 
1994). 
(2) Translating Capability Objectives into SoS Requirements 
The desire to integrate existing stove-piped Army command and control systems 
into a single integrated system drove the creation of the SoS (Department of the Army 
1994). Around 1995, there were several individual systems such as the FBCB2 and Blue 
Force Tracker (BFT) being developed independently. The Program Executive Officer 
Command, Control, and Communications Tactical (PEO C3T) attempted to create an SoS 
from these evolving systems (Greene and Mendoza 2005). This broad task was a 
straightforward capability need, and the integration was all network-centric, as opposed 
to an SoS for which physical integration was necessary. The challenge that stemmed from 
translating capability objectives into requirements was addressed by the Chief of Staff of 
the Army (CSA) of the Army in 2003. He realized that most of the individual C2 
platforms being developed were based on bottom-up information (Greene and Mendoza 
2005). Many of the individual systems, such as the FBCB2, were created to pull 
information from subordinate units. In the case of the FBCB2, subordinate units would 
usually communicate their location through radio, and a member of the Army staff would 
update their location on the map. The CSA realized the need for a top-down approach to 
the ABCS acquisition. This would mean that requirements would be looked at from the 
service and joint levels (Greene and Mendoza 2005). This top-down approach helped to 
lay the groundwork for the SoS architecture that currently exists.  
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(3) Understanding the Constituent Systems and Their Relationships 
One of the positive things about the initial bottom-up development of ABCS 
constituent systems was that it allowed users at the lowest level to become familiar with 
the system. This familiarity led to increased and valuable user feedback when the 
individual systems were being developed. As stated in the article by Greene and 
Mendoza, “Development of ABCS 6.4 is proceeding from the warfighter’s perspective 
and incorporates user feedback that defines 69 operational good enough requirements” 
(2005, 201). Incorporating users at the lowest level created a broad knowledge base of 
individuals on their respective systems, which facilitated the understanding of the 
relationship between systems. Another point is that all of the subordinate systems were 
specific to a particular Army branch. For example, the AMDWS was created based on the 
tactical needs of the Air Defense branch; the AFATDS was based on the tactical needs of 
the field artillery. The Army at the time had a lot of experience with combined operations 
from exercises and previous conflicts, so understanding the relationships between 
platforms was easier for this reason as well. 
(4) Assessing Performance to Capability Objectives 
As previously mentioned, the incorporation of user feedback was a significant 
factor in the ABCS acquisition. This as well as testing had a positive impact on assessing 
the ABCS performance. Additionally, in 2003, the CSA established metrics for where the 
ABCS should focus their efforts. These metrics centered on the following areas: 
•  Friendly Locations 
•  Current Enemy Situation 
•  Running Estimate 
•  Graphic Control Measures 
•  Fragmentary Orders 
•  Commanders Situation Report 
•  Fire Support Coordination Measures/Capabilities Overlay 
•  Joint and Coalition Interoperability 




There was a lot of information contained in all of these systems. When the CSA 
focused on these areas for performance, it made it a lot easier to assess the performance 
against capability objectives. The CSA wanted to establish a system that was “good 
enough” for fielding (Greene and Mendoza 2005). 
(5) Developing and Evolving an SoS Architecture 
Developing the SoS architecture for the ABCS was challenging for the Army. 
Individual systems were already fielded in the respective Army branches. Additionally, 
Army doctrine such as the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) required Army 
staff at high levels to conceptually integrate information from different Army branches 
(Frambes 2005). Conceptually, most of the analysis required to develop an SoS structure 
had already been completed. However, the transition from a stovepipe process to an SoS 
process created challenges when trying to create a networked architecture. As stated by 
Greene and Mendoza, “ABCS 6.4 good enough was moving from a loosely coupled 
architecture to a tightly coupled SOS architecture, but too often, issues and problems 
were perceived as individual software releases geared to stovepipe solutions” (2005, 
206). This challenge was mitigated by the establishment of several integrated product 
teams (IPTs) that focused on SoS development in several different areas. 
(6) Monitoring and Assessing Changes 
Once the ABCS was established as an SoS, individual systems, such as the 
Command Post of the Future (CPOF), were created to be interoperable with the ABCS. 
Even though the CPOF was developed as an individual system, one of the requirements 
for it to become a program of record was to establish interoperability with the ABCS 
(Greene 2010). Other systems, such as the DCGS-A, which is the intelligence tool that 
evolved from the All Source Analysis System (ASAS), followed a similar pattern. The 
IPTs were also instrumental in monitoring and assessing system changes. They ensured 
that major software upgrades for the ABCS were coordinated through individual systems. 
The ABCS has transitioned to a Publish and Subscribe Server (PASS) system and made 
more than four major software updates without degrading the individual systems’ 
capabilities (Greene 2010).  
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(7) Addressing Requirements and Solution Options 
The ABCS had the benefit of operational testing at the SoS level. As shown 
earlier, SoS testing is extremely difficult due to individual systems being in different 
levels of maturity and different stages of the acquisition process. ABCS SoS testing led to 
the identification of requirements outside the scope of individual systems, and proposed 
solution options for the SoS as a whole. As stated in the Directorate of Operational Test 
and Evaluation (DOT&E) pamphlet, “The ABCS SoS assessment contributed valuable 
insights to the evaluations of the individual acquisition programs. By taking a more 
holistic approach, the assessment identified significant issues beyond the scope of a 
single program manager’s responsibility” (2005, 46). This suggests that the SoS testing 
addressed SoS requirements and also addressed individual system issues to help meet 
individual system requirements. The results of this testing led to proposed solutions that 
addressed SoSs as well as individual system requirements. It also underscored the fact 
that with SoS, testing of the entire SoS produces results that cannot be obtained from 
testing systems individually. These recommendations included an improved network 
architecture, increased network security, and funding for collective training (DOT&E 
Army Programs 2005, 46). Testing also led to the development of the central information 
server that exists with the system today. 
(8) Orchestrating Upgrades to SoS 
In 2004, the Army decided to change the direction of the ABCS development 
from a bottom-up approach to a top-down approach. During this time the Army also 
refocused and reprioritized the desired capabilities for the ABCS. The PEO organized the 
Army stakeholders into several IPTs and established what he termed as “good enough” 
requirements for the IPTs to achieve in the 6.4 version of ABCS (Greene and Mendoza 
2005, 206). The good enough requirements were important because they provided a 
capability while acknowledging that the SoS would not be fully mature with version 6.4. 
This iterative approach to development encourages developers to design systems and 
architectures that could be upgraded easily in the future without major changes to the 
system architecture. Since 2005, the ABCS has successfully added new systems, such as 
the CPOF, and the ABCS is becoming part of a broader Army initiative called Capability 
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Set 13 (CS-13). Capability Set 13 and those that follow will significantly increase the 
network capacity of the ABCS, and add platforms for the dismounted soldier to access 
information provided by the ABCS. This ability to orchestrate upgrades was enhanced by 
the decision to incrementally field systems while keeping upgrades in mind. 
C. FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS 
The Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) represents the biggest SoS undertaking 
that the Army has ever attempted. The idea started in 1999 and large portions of the 
program were cancelled by 2009. The Army FCS was a directed SoS intended to 
completely change the way the Army fought wars. The idea originated from then Army 
Chief of Staff General Shinseki. His intent was to take the existing Army division 
structure and transform it to a lighter, more mobile force that could deploy a division-
sized unit in five days (Feickert 2009). The SoS would take existing Army platforms and 
integrate these platforms into a large network that would be consistent throughout the 
whole Army. The FCS was the largest acquisition project the Army ever attempted in 
terms of cost. It was also the first time that the Army initiated an SoS; usually the Army 
would identify a capability gap and build a system or combine systems to meet this 
capability gap. The FCS was the first directed SoS for the Army. The FCS consisted of 
four systems: the manned FCS ground systems, unmanned air vehicles, unmanned 
ground vehicles, and sensors/weapons. Table 3 describes the typical equipment that 
would be organic to an FCS Brigade. 
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Table 3.   Army FCS Brigade Equipment List (from Congressional Budget 
Office 2006, 30) 
 
 
All of the subsystems in the manned systems category were designed to be lighter 
and faster versions of Army legacy systems. For example, the mounted combat system 
(MCS) was intended to be a lighter and faster version of the Abrams tank with equivalent 
firepower (Congressional Budget Office [CBO] 2006). The infantry carrier vehicle (ICV) 
would replace the Bradley fighting vehicle and M113 personnel carriers. The ICV would 
also be lighter and faster than the Bradley with increased firepower. Similarly, the non-
line of sight mortar and cannon (NLOS-M/C) would replace the M-113 and M109 
howitzer, respectively (CBO 2006). The recovery and maintenance vehicle would replace 
the M88 recovery vehicle (CBO 2006). The unmanned ground vehicle system was split 
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into four classes, and each class would be designed to support a specific Army force size. 
The class I UAVs would be designed for the individual soldier, the class II UAVs would 
support a company-sized element, the class III UAVs would support a battalion-sized 
element, and the class IV UAVs would support a brigade-sized element (CBO 2006). The 
unmanned aerial UAVs were divided into a similar class structure as the unmanned 
ground system, and they supported the same-sized unit. The unmanned sensor and fire 
systems would be designed to increase intelligence and initiate fires via remote control. 
Figure 8 shows the FCS SoS and its constituent systems. 
 
Figure 8.  Army FCS SoS (from Global Security.Org 2011) 
(1) FCS Acquisition 
The FCS acquisition plan was a long-term but aggressive plan to get the entire 
Army transformed by the year 2032 (Feickert 2009). The plan called for seventy-one 
Army Brigades, each having eighteen systems fielded by 2032. It was soon realized that 
this schedule could not be maintained and several changes occurred, including reducing 
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the number of simultaneously fielded systems from eighteen to fourteen, and program 
restructuring that occurred in 2004 (CBO 2006). This also reduced the number of systems 
that were simultaneously fielded.  There were several contractors on the FCS project as 
well. DARPA was one of the primary contractors, and they worked with the lead system 
integrator (LSI) team of Boeing and SAIC (Gansler 2009).  Much of the work was 
subcontracted as well. This proved to be a challenge when trying to test and integrate 
systems at the SoS level. Further, the cost of the FCS was intended to be roughly $200 
billion for research and development and procurement (CBO 2006). However, during the 
program’s first four years, the program experienced cost growth between sixty-nine to 
100 billion dollars more than initially estimated. The increasing cost growth without 
substantial, tangible results led to the program’s cancellation in 2009 (Cordesman 2009). 
Looking at the core concepts of SoS engineering will provide some insights into potential 
reasons for why the program was canceled. 
(2) Translating Capability Objectives 
The FCS program had a broad capability to make the Army “more responsive, 
lethal, versatile, survivable, and sustainable” (Pernin et al 2012, 9). Although SoS 
capability objectives must be broad enough to generate SoS requirements, the capability 
objectives described for the FCS, such as lethality and versatility, were broad enough to 
generate multiple SoSs. The FCS was expected to address all of these warfighting 
functions simultaneously. Although the initial objectives were broad, when they were 
translated into requirements, they became very specific down to the system level. There 
must be a delicate balance between requirements that are specific enough to meet the 
objectives, but not so specific that they impact the generation of alternatives for the SoS. 
In the case of the FCS, requirements significantly reduced the design space for the SoS. 
An example of this can be seen from the C-130 requirement. All FCS systems were 
required to be C-130 deployable. This was considered a non-negotiable requirement 
(Pernin et al 2012). As a result, this requirement would impact the size and weight of all 
the platforms being designed. Although the increase in time and money was not 
quantified, this requirement likely resulted in unnecessary additional costs and time; the 
Army has other air assets available that could be used to air transport the FCS. As the 
 40 
FCS progressed, the restrictive nature of the C-130 requirement became apparent. Efforts 
to try and change this requirement would prove difficult, as evidenced by the RAND 
report which states that removing the C-130 requirement “would have introduced major 
inconsistencies into the overarching plan, which made that requirement difficult to revise 
without overturning fundamental notions about how FCS would fight” (Pernin et al 2012, 
58). The requirement was eventually relaxed a few years later. 
(3) Understanding Systems and Relationships 
The FCS platforms were primarily based on existing systems. For example, the 
MCS was centered on maneuver vehicles such as the Abram and Bradley vehicles. The 
unmanned aerial and ground vehicles were designed to support specific force sizes in the 
Army. As a result, clear system boundaries were established for each of the platforms, 
and their relationships with other systems were also clearly understood because legacy 
versions of the platforms already existed, and new platforms fell within the boundaries of 
existing Army force structure. For example, there were unmanned vehicles designed to 
support the individual, company, battalion, and brigade levels. The challenge arose when 
trying to understand network system boundaries. The FCS was required to be completely 
interoperable (Davis and Bagwell 2004). Each platform would have the capability to pass 
information to other platforms. The approach to accomplish this networked activity was 
to build platforms only after they had demonstrated the ability to communicate with 
existing platforms. Evidence of the interoperability requirement is illustrated in an SoS 
integration report, which states: “Specific FCS systems will be procured only after four 
dimensions of integration are demonstrated—vertical, horizontal, performance and 
interoperable” (Davis and Bagwell 2004, 17). The vertical and horizontal dimensions 
mirror the Army’s expectations for communication on the battlefield. For example, a 
brigade level system must be able to communicate with its subordinate battalion level 
systems. Horizontal communications refer to systems at the battalion level being able to 
communicate with other battalion level systems. Performance and interoperability are 
based on metrics defined in the requirements. The four-dimension integration proved to 
be challenging because there were several different contractors, such as Boeing, General 
Dynamics, DARPA, and SAIC, working on the platforms. This approach to integrating 
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the platforms did not demonstrate a true understanding of systems and boundaries 
because each of these contractors has its own agenda and its own information which it 
may be unwilling to share. The different contractors involved that were supposed to 
collaborate did not collaborate enough to build the type of SoS that the Army envisioned. 
(4) Assessing Performance to Capability Objectives 
Assessing the performance to capability objectives was challenging because the 
FCS was such a massive project (Pernin et al 2012). The FCS was designed to address 
future capabilities by upgrading old systems. As a result, several assumptions were 
necessary to build the system. As stated in the Pernin RAND study, one assumption that 
had a profound impact on assessing performance to capability was that the U.S. Army 
would be engaged in state-to-state conflicts. While there was some insurgency in one 
particular scenario, most of the scenarios focused on state-to-state actors (Pernin et al 
2012). Another assumption was that the capabilities for conventional warfare would be 
sufficient to combat insurgent warfare. The focus on state-to-state actors framed the 
context for which the SoS was evaluated against capabilities. A few years later, in 2004 
and beyond when the United States faced insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
FCS was disconnected with the current threat. The FCS depended almost completely on 
simulation testing to assess performance to capabilities (Pernin et al 2012). While 
simulation is a cost-effective tool, it does not always yield accurate results on how the 
system will perform, because models are only as good as their inputs and the validity of 
the model assumptions. Assessing the performance was shaped by assumptions that were 
not necessarily true. As a result, the FCS program conducted testing and evaluation based 
on invalid assumptions, which led to an inaccurate assessment of performance to 
capability objectives. 
(5) Developing and Evolving an SoS Architecture 
Individual system requirements for FCS systems were conducted in conjunction 
with SoS system requirements. This dual development made it difficult to establish a 
system architecture at the SoS level. As alluded to in the RAND study, systems 
engineering was being conducted at the system level. During this process, trade-offs were 
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also conducted at the system level without taking SoS level requirements into 
consideration (Pernin 2012). This suggests that the individual systems had a significant 
impact on the intended SoS architecture. The individual systems were so complex that by 
the time the systems were considered in the context of an SoS, the trade-offs would be 
costly in performance, schedule, or dollars to make any changes that facilitated the SoS 
development. There is no evidence suggesting that any detailed SoS architecture was 
conducted early in the SoS development. Ideally, for a directed SoS, an SoS architecture 
should be completed first so that individual systems can maintain an SoS perspective 
when designing and building individual systems. This was not the case for the FCS. 
Without a baseline architecture, individual systems were designed independently and 
then expected to integrate with existing systems. This type of approach is more 
appropriate for an acknowledged SoS system. In an acknowledged SoS, the platforms 
already exist, and therefore a bottom-up approach is necessary. In an acknowledged SoS, 
most individuals are familiar with the existing systems so it is easier to suggest trade-offs 
and come up with ways for systems to be interoperable. In the case of the FCS, the SoS 
was directed but approached from the bottom up as if the systems were already in place. 
Further evidence of the issues with this bottom-up approach is described in the RAND 
study, which states: 
Often it was difficult to understand exactly how individual requirements 
interacted with one another and fit into the operational architecture, which 
was relatively underdeveloped and reportedly marginalized as the program 
focused on preparing the ORD for JROC approval to pass Milestone B. 
(Pernin et al 2012, 93) 
(6) Monitoring and Assessing Changes 
As previously stated, the acquisition budget grew by almost $100 billion over 
three years. During that time period and a couple of years prior, several changes took 
place in the FCS program that was not accurately assessed. According to a Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, budget constraints led to the reduction 
of four FCS constituent systems. Although it was intended to reduce cost, there was no 
change in the budget to reflect this reduction (Cordesman 2009). One of the characteristic 
traits of the FCS acquisition was that developers did not seem to understand how external 
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SoS changes such as program cuts would impact the system. Some of this stemmed from 
not having an SoS architecture, and part of it stemmed from the lack of understanding of 
how new systems would be interoperable with one another. Requirements changes also 
were difficult to assess. As each system developed independently with its own 
requirements, when changes were necessary to accommodate the SoS, they often 
occurred slowly and sometimes at a cost (Cordesman 2009). These costs led to system 
cost and schedule growth without any significant system development progress.  
In the early stages of the Iraq and Afghanistan war, there was a notable difference 
in the insurgency the coalition force was fighting and the type of operations the FCS was 
being designed to accomplish. To mitigate this discrepancy, the FCS changed the 
acquisition strategy to adapt to the changing environment in these theaters. These “spin-
out” technologies would go directly to the soldiers on the ground and have a separate 
development schedule than the FCS (Pernin et al. 2012). These spin outs led to the 
development of some UAVs and unmanned ground systems. However, as the RAND 
study points out, these spin outs were not part of the original plan and added to the cost, 
and delayed the schedule (Pernin et al 2012). The long-term FCS project was 
transforming into both a long- and short-term project without the staff to support such a 
change. As stated in the RAND study, “Interviews with officials highlighted how the 
spin-outs took valuable time from certain participants in the program who would 
otherwise be thinking about longer-term development issues and requirements” (Pernin et 
al 2012, 38).  
(7) Addressing SoS Requirements and Solution Options 
The issue of requirements at the system level and the SoS level has been 
addressed extensively in this paper. These issues stemmed from the development of 
individual systems without an SoS perspective. Another aspect of the requirements was 
the validation process for the FCS program. Due to General Shinseki’s eagerness to begin 
fielding the system as quickly as possible, the FCS program did not go through the 
rigorous requirements validation programs that normal acquisition programs go through 
(Bradford 2011). The FCS bypassed key senior Army leaders who may have been able to 
 44 
add valuable input to the requirement generation process. As a result, several changes had 
to occur after time was spent building to requirements that had not been properly vetted.  
The FCS was intended to move the Army into the future. As stated earlier, most 
of the requirements were geared toward operating the FCS in a conventional war. 
However, during development an unconventional war was occurring, which caused the 
FCS to change its acquisition strategy to accommodate the ongoing conflict. It is difficult 
to find solution options if the problem keeps changing. In the case of the FCS, the 
problem the FCS was originally optimized to address changed significantly. This often 
leads to scope creep and a suboptimal solution to multiple problems. The FCS was 
heading down that road before it was cancelled in 2009. 
(8) Orchestrating SoS Upgrades 
In 2009, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made the decision to cancel the 
FCS program. Although the FCS as an SoS never came to fruition, the FCS efforts led to 
successful spin-off systems. For example, a lot of the technology used for the Maneuver 
control subsystem was used to develop the Army’s current Ground Combat Systems 
(GCS) (Pernin et al 2012). Further, much of the technology used to develop unmanned 
ground and air vehicles was salvaged and fielded in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Additionally, on a smaller scale some of the network architecture was used for future 
systems. Other potential spinoffs likely did not take place due to the Army having to 
spend nearly one billion dollars to cancel existing contracts. 
D. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY LESSONS LEARNED 
The following lessons learned have been obtained from the three case studies.  
These lessons learned will be used in Chapters IV and V to recommend process and 
organizational changes respectively. 
(1) Lesson #1: Leverage the JUONS process for urgent need SoSs. 
The complexity of the acquisitions process often results in the belief that all SoS 
acquisitions will be complex efforts that take a significant amount of time to go through 
the acquisition process. From the C-RAM, one can note that an SoS acquisition does not 
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necessarily have to be a long-term acquisition process, especially when dealing with an 
acknowledged SoS. The C-RAM was able to use existing platforms and provide a partial 
solution to the incoming mortar problem within fifteen months of the problem being 
identified. The process started with a JUONS that specifically addresses urgent threats. 
The C-RAM is an example of how this process can be leveraged for SoSs as well as 
individual systems. Using the JUONS process or an abbreviated acquisition process for 
directed SoSs is difficult, and should not be done unless absolutely necessary. The FCS 
illustrates an example of the potential pitfalls of abbreviating the acquisition process for a 
directed SoS. 
(2) Lesson #2: Establishing a strong link from a needs statement to an SoS 
architecture to CONOPS development is essential. 
The C-RAM also illustrates the importance of creating a need statement for SoS 
that is specific enough to meet the need, but general enough to generate enough 
alternatives to choose from. Additionally, the C-RAM underscored the importance of an 
SoS architecture that develops an OV-1 at a minimum. The OV-1 will facilitate a concept 
of operation for the SoS. This is important because it forces decision makers to think 
about how the SoS will work together, and it identifies problems in the early stages of 
development. The C-RAM underscored the need for a thorough logistics plan that is 
generated from the CONOPS. An SoS will have a lot of components, so it is important 
that a logistical plan is in place to carry the SoS through the life cycle of various 
CONOPS. Moreover, the C-RAM demonstrated the importance of setting up an 
architecture that facilitates upgrades. The C-RAM SoS conducted several software 
upgrades as well as platform upgrades without major SoS configuration changes. One 
must always look to future integration and interoperability requirements when 
establishing architecture for an SoS.  
The FCS program used simulations to analyze the concept of operations. 
However, most of the simulations were based on conventional operations that the United 
States was used to fighting. A diagrammed SoS architecture, such as the SoS DODAF 
models, could have led to a broader view of SoS capabilities, and possibly could have 
placed more emphasis on unconventional wars, such as the insurgencies in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan. The FCS program instead made program changes after a significant amount 
of money was already spent.  
(3) Lesson #3: Limit the scope of objectives for the SoS during a single 
iteration. 
The FCS demonstrates the difficulty of implementing platform and network 
integration and interoperability in one iteration. During the FCS acquisition, platforms 
were built and then used to integrate with existing systems. This caused a significant 
delay in the development schedule. Directed SoSs should normally build the platforms 
during early iterations, and then use future iterations for integration and interoperability. 
The SoS wave model is discussed in the following chapter but one of the benefits of the 
SoS wave model is that it focuses on the evolution of the SoS so that iterations of 
development can be planned and resourced appropriately. The ABCS acquisition used a 
limited set of objectives for the initial SoS. Although there were many goals for the final 
system, the CSA focused on eight central objectives before the system was fielded. Often, 
a workable solution can be fielded when objectives are prioritized. This would expedite 
the acquisition process for SoS. Using the wave model and developing an architecture 
early in the acquisition process will lead to an effective balance of scope and time. 
Limiting the scope will enable stakeholders to field workable solutions in the short-term, 
while aiming to achieve optimal long-term solutions on future SoS iterations. 
(4) Lesson #4: Use a bottom-up approach for an acknowledged SoS. 
SE and SoS SE are both top-down processes. It is important that the SoS goals are 
clearly articulated at an SoS level before attempting to build an SoS. However, in an 
acknowledged SOS, it may be appropriate to generate requirements using a bottom-up 
approach for existing systems. A bottom-up approach looks at the individual system and 
explores relationships with other systems in order to create an SoS from existing systems. 
The advantage of this bottom-up process is that it can increase capabilities without 
initiating the JCIDS process. This bottom-up approach will lead to increased capabilities, 
and increased connectivity with existing systems. The ABCS used the bottom-up 
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approach effectively during testing, and incorporated a lot of the user feedback from 
individual systems to generate SoS requirements. 
(5) Lesson #5: Align SoS boundaries with organizational boundaries if 
possible. 
An SoS has complex physical and virtual boundaries that could potentially lead to 
scope creep in the acquisition process if not understood properly. An important point 
when creating an SoS is to try and use existing organizational boundaries for initial SoS 
development. If the subordinate system boundaries correspond to an organizational 
boundary in the Army, such as a system that is specific to one Army branch, it will be 
easier to understand how systems interact with each other, because it will be similar to 
existing organizational boundary interactions. For example, in the ABCS, the Air 
Defense Artillery and Field Artillery use the AMDWS and the AFATDS, respectively. 
These Army branches have experience with combined arms warfare, and this combined 
arms experience led to a better understanding of how the ABCS constituent systems 
should interact at an SoS level. Using existing organizational boundaries as the basis for 
SoS development leads to better understanding of the interactions that must take place 
between the constituent systems. 
(6) Lesson #6: Establish roles for IPTs and LSIs early in the acquisition 
process. 
The ABCS proved that an IPT is essential to the SoS development process. An 
IPT will have the perspective to align constituent systems with the SoS vision. The LSI 
for the FCS was established early, but the role of the LSI in FCS was very broad, and 
seemed to evolve as the program developed. The IPTs and LSIs must have clearly 
defined roles early in the process so that they can create and maintain an SoS perspective 
throughout the acquisition process. Additionally, if a private company assumes the LSI or 
IPT role, there must be a government counterpart that sets the boundaries for these 
private companies. This will prevent situations that occurred during the FCS acquisition 
where the LSI had the authority to make major acquisition decisions without approval 
from the Army. 
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(7) Lesson #7: Require top-down management for a directed SoS. 
Generating requirements for a directed SoS must be a top-down process. 
Requirements for the FCS initially focused on building individual systems. As the Army 
tried to integrate systems, it became evident that the requirements between systems were 
not coordinated, and this had a significant impact on SoS development. Additionally, 
using a bottom-up process to generate requirements when you have several different 
contractors working on the SoS could be problematic, because defense contractors may 
show limited flexibility when it comes to changing requirements to accommodate the 
SoS, especially if they feel a change in requirements would impact their bottom line. 
Therefore, it is especially important when dealing with multiple contractors to ensure that 
the requirements are generated from an SoS perspective.  This SoS perspective will 
ensure that contractors building constituent systems keep the SoS at the forefront during 
acquisition development.  
(8) Lesson #8: Develop an SoS architecture early in the acquisition process. 
In addition to top-down requirements, an SoS architecture should precede a 
systems architecture in a directed SoS. In the case of the FCS, each individual new 
system was required to demonstrate interoperability with all existing FCS systems before 
the new system could be fielded. This resulted in individual systems spending a lot of 
time on integration with previous systems. An SoS architecture with a central platform, 
or network—such as on the ABCS—to integrate all new and existing systems could have 
saved a lot of time. Once a decision is made for existing systems to become an 
acknowledged SoS, the SoS architecture should be built, and the constituent systems 






IV. ACQUISITION PROCESS CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter III discussed lessons learned from previous SoS acquisitions from the 
Army. These lessons are used in this chapter to describe processes that the Army would 
need to incorporate in order to apply an SoS perspective to all existing and future Army 
programs. The Army, unlike some other services, does not have a service-specific guide 
on SoS Engineering. The Army does have an SoS Engineering and Integration 
Directorate, which is an organization that primarily deals with the development and 
implementation of Army SoS. This organization will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter, but many of the processes that this organization deals with should be 
applied to the current Army acquisition process to facilitate an SoS perspective.  




Figure 9.  DOD Acquisition Process (from HQs Army 2007) 
A. CURRENT ARMY ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Although the processes n Figure 9 have been used to develop SoSs, the processes 
are primarily geared for developing individual systems. It should be noted that there are 
several intermediate steps involved in this acquisition process. However, this chapter will 
mainly focus on the processes illustrated in Figure 9. There have been several changes to 
the DOD acquisition process over the past several decades, with the most recent being the 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. This act attempted to mitigate the 
frequent cost and schedule overruns that were prevalent in the Army as well as the DOD. 
The first step in the Army acquisition process is identifying a user need based on 
capability gaps. These capability gaps should be able to be traced back to the National 
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Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. These 
gaps are identified and analyzed through the JCIDS process, which develops a capability-
based assessment that stems from an integrated architecture.  
B. CHANGES TO INTEGRATED ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
It is recommended that the Army better utilize DODAF for current and future 
Army acquisitions, and apply DODAF to document the SoS architecture.  
One of the lessons described in the previous chapter is the importance of an 
architectural framework such as DODAF to govern the SE or SoS engineering process. 
Greater emphasis needs to be placed on this integrated architecture from an SoS 
perspective. The current requirements for an integrated architecture suggest that it 
facilitates SoS development. However, as pointed out in a thesis by Patrick Hoff, the 
integrated architecture refers to an integration of multiple perspectives (2009) as opposed 
to multiple platforms or networks. These integrated architectures primarily bring multiple 
perspectives to a single system rather than an SoS. Evidence of the single system 
emphasis can be seen by examining the number of individual programs that have been 
initiated by the Army as opposed to an SoS.  
In 2009, for example, the Army had twenty-one MDAPs in various stages of the 
acquisition process. Out of these programs, only five were being developed as part of an 
SoS (Spainhower 2009). This includes the FCS, which was in the process of getting 
cancelled. The integrated architecture needs to take an SoS approach. The Army needs to 
examine existing systems and their capabilities, develop a comprehensive integrated 
systems architecture that depicts existing systems, and explore ways that these existing 
systems could relate to one another from an SoS perspective. Efforts to integrate systems 
from an SoS perspective have been explored in the DOD SE Guidebook (OSD 2008). 
The Navy’s SoS Engineering Guidebook (OASN [RDA] 2006) also contains an example 
of an SoS operational architecture that could be adopted by the Army, as seen from the 
diagram Figure 10.  
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Figure 10.  Integrated Architecture Navy SoS (from OASN [RDA] 2006) 
Another recommendation to accomplish this integrated architecture at an SoS 
level is the use of model based systems engineering (MBSE).  As discussed in the thesis 
by Major Tyronne LaStrapes (2012), MBSE has the potential to reduce the inherent 
complexity of integrating the numerous Army programs into an SoS architecture.  
Applying and standardizing MBSE automation tools to develop SoS architectures would 
provide an effective collaboration tool for the numerous stakeholders involved with 
developing and evolving architectures.  The thesis goes on to say that the use of system 
modeling language can provide a universal language that can be applied to streamline the 
SoS acquisition process (LaStrapes 2012).   
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C. CHANGES TO CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
It is recommended that the Army formally incorporate a DODAF OV-1 for SoS 
CONOPS development and consider adding other DODAF models as mandatory model 
requirements for the acquisition process. 
One can see from the diagram in Figure 10 that the architecture is decomposed 
both operationally and physically by constituent systems. This decomposition facilitates a 
clear understanding of how the SoS functions under different CONOPS scenarios. The 
Navy also advocates using several other DODAF views, such as the SV-8, System 
Evolution Description SV-9, System Technology Forecast TV-2, and Technical 
Standards Forecast (OASN [RDA] 2006, 29). These views can be applied to different 
phases of the acquisition process to facilitate the SoS engineering process. The Army 
should incorporate, at a minimum, an OV-1 that models the concepts of operation that 
will address the capabilities of the SoS as a whole. Other OV-1s may be necessary to 
diagram complex SoSs under different CONOPS.  An integrated SoS architecture 
analysis should be incorporated as a mandatory part of the acquisition process. Currently, 
there is no requirement for physically modeling system functions under different 
CONOPS (Keenan 2013). At a minimum, the OV-1 should be required during the JCIDS 
process, and published during the ICD. Incorporating the OV-1 will ensure new 
acquisitions are being examined from an SoS perspective early in the process.  
D. CHANGES TO TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
It is recommended the Army mandates that private firms demonstrate the ability 
for technology developments to integrate with an existing or future SoS. Further, the 
Army should reward private firms that demonstrate innovative ways to use technologies 
to integrate existing or future systems into an SoS. 
A clear SoS architecture will facilitate the technology development required for 
the SoS. Currently, the technology development in the Defense acquisition system is 
typically outsourced to private companies to compete for a government contract. This is 
evident by the news reports of numerous major defense acquisition programs awarded to 
private firms. Although there is a Research, Development, and Engineering Command 
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(RDECOM), the Army still contracts a significant portion of their R&D to the private 
sector. The Army typically funds competing companies to develop a prototype to meet 
the mission requirements of the Army (Angelis 2013).  The private firms then compete 
and are awarded based on a combination of factors. These factors are heavily weighted 
on the technological maturity of the prototype, and the cost estimate provided by the 
private firm (Angelis 2013). This process places an emphasis on the development of a 
new technology at a low cost. While awarding a contract based on these metrics may 
seem to be the most efficient process for the Army, an SoS approach could potentially 
achieve greater cost savings. For example, providing an incentive for private companies 
to integrate existing Army systems into an SoS would persuade private companies to 
approach their technological development from an SoS perspective. Currently, companies 
have no incentive to attempt to integrate existing systems. In fact, private firms that are 
profit driven generally view it in their best interests to build a new system because of the 
profit potential. Furthermore, the engineering of individual systems focuses more on the 
optimization of the individual system. This does not necessarily take into account any 
present or future requirements that may make it necessary to conduct trade-offs at the 
system level (Gansler 2009).  
As seen in Chapter III with the C-RAM, it is important for systems to accept 
potentially suboptimal system-level performance in order to optimize the SoS. 
Incorporating new policies that reward companies for developing technologies with the 
ability to integrate existing systems to achieve a capability will lead to an emphasis on 
the SoS engineering process. It will also mitigate some of the risks involved with trying 
to develop brand new technologies. Developing technologies that facilitate integration 
with existing Army platforms early in the acquisition process will save time and money. 
Therefore, before a Milestone B approval occurs, private competing firms should 
demonstrate in the capability development document (CDD) the ability for technologies 
to be integrated with existing systems from an SoS perspective. If this is not possible or 
feasible, this should be explained to the Milestone decision authority before the system is 
allowed to move to the next phase. 
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E. CHANGES TO SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION 
It is recommended that all acquisition funding be initially allocated at the SoS 
level and divided up into constituent systems based on the each systems’ objectives 
during an SoS acquisition. 
The CDD approval at milestone B substantiates the system as a program of record 
(POR). Under the current acquisition system, each POR has its own line of funding. As 
pointed out in Chapter III, the C-RAM funding was difficult to track because each 
individual system had its own line of funding. The acquisition process funding needs to 
better accommodate the SoS. If the individual systems maintain their own line of 
funding, then there is little incentive to use system funding to meet SoS objectives. Each 
SoS should have a POR with funding to cover the integration of each constituent system. 
There needs to be a detailed process of identifying all constituent systems and making an 
assessment based on the CDD on how much funding should be allocated at the SoS level. 
The importance of establishing funding lines and interoperability guidelines early in the 
acquisition process is underscored in a Carnegie Study referring to an SoS stating that 
“since the procurement cycles for both systems are driven by their individual 
requirements and funding lines, the result is that interoperability is delayed for 
unacceptably long periods of time” (Smith 2009, 8).  
The consolidation of SoS funding will pave the way for integration and 
interoperability early in the acquisition process. An SoS POR should be required before 
the engineering and manufacturing development phase begins. An SoS POR will also 
represent a shift in the culture of engineering. Engineers and developers may have to 
sacrifice the performance of the individual system to achieve a greater performance for 
the SoS. These trade-offs should be documented and presented to the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) for milestone C. The decision authority for milestone C should ensure 
that the SoS is properly scoped before approving production and deployment. A lesson 
learned from the FCS and the ABCS is that SoSs should understand that the SoS 
engineering is an iterative process and 100 percent of the capability may not be achieved 
during the first iteration. The program managers for the ABCS realized this when they 
determined a set of good enough functions for the initial fielding of the system. This type 
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of decision to reduce the scope was not made for the FCS. The scope actually expanded 
before production and deployment occurred. Identifying an appropriate scope for each 
iteration of the SoS development would allow an incremental acquisition that achieves 
most of the capability objectives, and sets the conditions for future SoS upgrades.  
F. CHANGES TO PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT PHASE 
It is recommended that SoSs simultaneously test as many constituent systems as 
feasible during the system development and demonstration phase, and clearly state 
assumptions used during testing. These assumptions must be clearly articulated in the test 
plan, and the test plan also must describe the impacts to the system if the assumptions do 
not hold true. 
During the production and deployment phase, low-rate initial production as well 
as full-rate production occurs for the system. This is also where system test and 
evaluation (T&E) occurs.  SoS testing is challenging when compared with system testing. 
SoS testing must have all constituent systems present to do a full SoS test. This is often 
difficult, as pointed out in Chapter II, due to different systems in different phases of the 
acquisition cycle. SoS testing is also resource intensive, and with funding always being a 
limited resource in the acquisition process, full SoS testing usually does not occur. 
Although these SoS challenges will remain in the near future, there are some best 
practices that should be implemented in the acquisition process.  
There must be a balance between testing each constituent system individually and 
testing the complete SoS. One important practice is to clearly articulate the testing that 
will have to be simulated due to funding or constituent system constraints. Another 
important practice is to focus testing on higher risk areas that have the most risk of 
degrading the SoS capability (NDIA 2012, Slide 7). Applying these testing practices 
requires a solid understanding of constituent systems and their relationships. This 
understanding can be achieved by applying the core concepts of SoS engineering to all 
SoS systems, and maintaining an SoS perspective throughout the acquisition process. 
Funding for the SoS testing should cover the complete testing of all individual systems as 
an SoS when possible. When this is not possible, a test plan should identify areas where 
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simulation is substituted for portions of the testing. The test plan should quantify, when 
possible, the risks involved with the simulation and the assumptions used during the 
simulation. 
One of the problems discussed with the FCS is that many assumptions were used 
for simulation testing that proved not to be true. The SoS test plan must identify potential 
consequences for a test assumption not being true, and attempt to validate or invalidate 
assumptions as soon as possible. The decision authority should take all of this 
information and determine whether the test needs to wait until more resources become 
available to do a more thorough SoS test, or plan to address these issues in another 
iteration of the SoS, or accept the test risks identified and proceed to full production 
without making arrangements to replace simulated tests with actual tests. This testing 
should be documented as part of the SoS engineering plan. Currently, according to AR 
70–1, there is only a requirement for an SE plan, even for an SoS (Department of the 
Army 2011). Incorporating a robust T&E plan at the SoS level is essential to the 
successful fielding of an SoS and should be part of the SoS SE plan.  
G. CHANGES TO PROGRAM MANAGER EVALUATION PROCESS 
It is recommended that the program manager (PM) evaluation process incentivize 
the PM’s efforts to integrate his or her program into its SoS framework. 
Another process change that is important is the process of evaluating program 
managers. PMs are currently evaluated primarily based on their ability to develop their 
program within cost and schedule. The PMs are normally assigned to a program for three 
years, and during this time frame, most of the focus is on meeting their program 
objectives in cost and schedule, and little time is focused on interoperability (Blanchette 
2005). As a result, there is less of an incentive to incorporate an SoS process that may 
take funding dollars or time away from the PMs individual programs. The evaluation 
process should change to incorporate how well the PM understood its individual program 
within the context of its SoS, and senior raters should evaluate the efforts the program 
made to integrate and achieve interoperability with other programs. This is not suggesting 
that cost and schedule requirements should not be evaluated, but that the process change 
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should look at cost and schedule overruns in context, and reward PMs who sacrificed 
time and money on their individual programs to accommodate the SoS. Organizational 
changes to facilitate this process will be discussed in Chapter V. 
H. CHANGES TO OPERATION AND SUPPORT PHASE 
It is recommended that the Army use the SoS wave model as an assessment tool 
for SoS architectural evolutions, and future SoS updates.  
As stated in the second chapter, one of the characteristics of SoS is emergence. 
During the operation and support phase of the acquisition process, there needs to be a 
systems assessment period where the system is assessed against required capabilities. 
Further, additional assessments must be made on emergent capabilities and risks 
identified during operational use of the SoS. This assessment should be documented and 
reviewed before any SoS upgrades are executed. Assessing the system at this stage will 
ensure future SoS upgrades build off of work already completed, and minimize the 
duplication of effort that would go into developing a capability that was overlooked 
because of a missed emergent trait.  
The wave model should be used in conjunction with the acquisition process to 
emphasize the process changes discussed in this chapter. It covers the development and 
evolution of an SoS architecture, the importance of testing, and the importance of SoS 
evolvement. Figure 11 is an illustration of the wave model. 
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Figure 11.  Wave Model (from Dahmann 2012) 
This model should be used in conjunction with the current acquisition process to facilitate 
an SoS approach to acquisitions. The wave model is simple but it emphasizes the iterative 
nature of the SoS acquisition process. The model focuses on developing and evolving the 
SoS architecture while planning for the SoS upgrade and implementation in parallel.   
Another undertaking that should be incorporated into the acquisition process from 
an SoS perspective is to establish PORs to take existing systems and integrate them to 
produce capabilities that may not have come out of the JCIDS process. This also uses the 
concept of emergence that exists in SoSs. The acquisition process is currently a top-down 
process, but understanding individual systems and their relationships to one another may 
lead to a bottom-up process that explores ways that existing platforms or systems can 
operate together. A bottom-up process may not be driven by a capability gap assessment 
from the JCIDS; however, the effort could provide meaningful capabilities for the Army 
in the longer term. The successful integration between systems will lead to increased 
capabilities for the Army. 
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This chapter has discussed ways that the existing Army acquisition process can 
implement an SoS engineering approach to future acquisitions. Chapter V discusses how 




V. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES TO FACILITATE AN SOS 
PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter focuses on organizational changes that could facilitate the SoS 
process. Changing the process for SoS engineering requires simultaneous changes in the 
organization in order to maintain efficiency and effectiveness (Giachetti 2010). The 
Army currently has an SoS Engineering and Integration directorate. The engineering and 
integration directorates were combined in 2013. This was a significant step in 
consolidating the acquisition efforts of Army SoS. However, the Army acquisition 
process is still very system focused. Further, efforts to integrate the SoS engineering and 
integration directorate with the current Army acquisition process should take place to 
facilitate acquisitions from an SoS perspective.  
A. CURRENT ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The current organizational chart for Army acquisition, logistics, and 




Figure 12.  ASAALT Acquisition Chart (from Carroll 2015) 
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The SoS Engineering and Integration is further divided into current and future 
programs. They do not, however, have any direct control over the management of 
acquisition systems or SoS. The Program Executive Officers (PEOs) have the 
responsibility of managing materiel acquisitions in their respective areas. They can be 
senior officers or government officials and they serve specifically as planning and budget 
authorities for all programs in their portfolio (Blanchette 2005). In total, the Army has 
twelve PEOs. Each may be responsible for one, or several, programs that fall under the 
PEOs area of responsibility. The PEOs are responsible for integration and interoperability 
across all their programs, but not necessarily integration between PEOs. PEOs use the 
framework developed from the JCIDS process to facilitate integration between programs.  
B. ROLE OF SOS ENGINEERS IN JCIDS 
It is recommended that the Army trains and designates SoS engineers as 
mandatory stakeholders in the JCIDS process for Army acquisitions. 
As pointed out in Chapter IV, JCIDS analysis is supposed to analyze architectures 
from a joint perspective but the processes and the funding support a service- and PEO-
specific acquisition process. This often leads to a system-oriented process that does not 
benefit from a potential SoS approach. There must be Army SoS representation in the 
JCIDS process. These members would be responsible for implementing and 
disseminating the SoS perspective to the PEOs, who would disseminate this information 
to the program managers. There is currently a gap that exists between the JCIDS process 
and the way capabilities are delivered to the warfighter. A CSIS study published in 2008 
stated, “Although JCIDS ‘socialized’ all participants into thinking jointly about capability 
needs, the process did not define precisely joint capability gaps or prioritize between 
them” (Hicks 2008, 59). Although efforts have been made to bridge the gap between the 
JCIDS and delivering needed capabilities to the warfighter, the process would benefit 
greatly from Army SoS engineers taking part in the JCIDS process. These SoS engineers 
must have extensive knowledge of current Army programs so that they can clearly 
articulate the SoS framework to PEOs. Further, it is essential for these SoS engineers to 
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be involved in the JCIDS process because it is early enough in the acquisition process to 
get the full benefit of SoS Engineering.  
C. ROLE OF THE CHIEF INTEROPERABILITY OFFICER 
It is recommended that a Chief Interoperability Officer be assigned to all future 
Army acquisitions early in the process. This officer will be the authority on all 
interoperability issues, and ensure that interoperability objectives are met in the JCIDS 
process. 
One of the issues that Army PEOs have identified with the acquisition process is 
the lack of understanding of interoperability. In an interview conducted with several 
PEOs, one of the common themes was that program managers did not understand 
interoperability. PEOs often stated that program managers viewed interoperability as a 
cost line and did not understand how to implement it within the context of their program 
(Blanchette 2005). Further, interoperability across programs is a PEO responsibility, but 
there is no requirement for interoperability between PEOs. As a result, there are PEOs 
trying to get program managers to become interoperable across programs when they do 
not clearly understand what needs to be done in order to achieve this interoperability. 
Blanchette (2005) observes that several PEOs believe that this confusion stems from a 
lack of central authority on interoperability issues. The report states:  
However, several PEOs identified the need for “one trail boss,” that is, a 
central authority with the broader perspective on interoperability. One 
PEO suggested that this authority should reside at the Department of 
Army or Joint Services level. (11) 
This suggests that an authority on interoperability would be beneficial to the 
acquisition process. They, along with a staff, can set the interoperability guidelines for 
each SoS program. Additionally, this interoperability authority could mitigate some of 
the challenges associated with demonstrating a net-readiness capability as required by the 
JCIDS process. This could prevent incidents like the FCS discussed in Chapter III. In this 
case, interoperability was a requirement for a new system to be built, but there were no 
specific guidelines on how the interoperability would occur. The FCS seemed to 
approach interoperability as an individual system responsibility as each system was built, 
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rather than starting with an interoperability plan and building each system in accordance 
with the plan. An interoperability authority in the JCIDS process could mitigate some of 
the problems that occurred during the FCS acquisition process.  
D. ROLE OF THE LEAD SYSTEM INTEGRATOR 
It is recommended that the Army train personnel in order to make the 
organizational role of LSI a government function, or at a minimum oversee private 
companies that assume this role. 
Another issue relating to interoperability deals with the LSI concept that was used 
to develop the FCS. One of the issues with this concept is that integration and 
interoperability was left up to the contractors, with little government oversight. This was 
the case with the FCS, where Gansler (2009) states: 
LSIs, however have been given broad, government-like authority to 
execute acquisition programs that include development of individual 
system requirements, contracting for their development and procurement, 
and coordination of development schedule and efforts. (vii) 
The research paper goes on to say that the reason the government relies so heavily on the 
LSI contractor is the lack of organic expertise in the government when it comes to SoS 
Engineering, interoperability, and integration (Gansler 2009). It is important that the 
government invests in the personnel that are capable of understanding the role of the LSI. 
This would, at a minimum, provide oversight to the LSI contractors if the government 
chooses to contract the LSI job. Ideally, the government would have the organic 
capability to perform as an LSI for SoS programs. The Army currently has organizations 
that can foster the knowledge required for an LSI. For example, RDECOM has several 
organizations that cover a wide spectrum of Army functions and future capabilities. 
RDECOM can be used to train LSIs for SoS acquisitions. Additionally, expanding the 
SoS engineering and integration directorate is another option to acquire the necessary 
expertise to perform LSI functions.  Trained LSIs in DOD will limit the authority that the 
defense contractors have with regard to LSIs. These companies are profit driven as 
opposed to process driven. Using LSIs from the government will help facilitate the SoS 
engineering process during SoS acquisitions. 
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E. ROLE OF THE CAPABILITY PORTFOLIO MANAGER 
It is recommended that capability portfolio managers be assigned at the PEO 
level, and that current and future SoS acquisitions are organized based on the capability 
manager’s area of responsibility as opposed to the PEOs. 
Another organizational change that would benefit the acquisition of systems from 
an SoS perspective is the implementation of capability portfolio managers. The Army 
currently assigns TRADOC capability managers (TCMs) to programs. These TCMs are 
assigned as TRADOC counterparts to program managers. They are primarily responsible 
for incorporating all doctrine, organization, training, leadership, education, personnel, 
and facilities (DOTMLPF) (Keenen 2013). Assigning TCMs with the PMs ensure that the 
individual program addresses capabilities across the Army’s functional domains; 
however, these capability managers are not an integral part of the JCIDS process that 
decides what materiel solutions to develop. As a result, the TCMs are part of materiel 
development but not involved in the decision process that initiates the materiel 
development. Capability managers should also be used on a macro level to facilitate the 
SoS acquisition process. These capability managers should be assigned as counterparts to 
the PEOs along with the TCMs that are counterparts at the program level. Figure 12 
describes the current organization of PEOs, but, as stated earlier, this does not facilitate 
the interoperability and integration required at the SoS level. Table 4 is from a RAND 
dissertation that lists eleven of the Force Operating Capabilities (FOC) that the Army 








Table 4.   Eleven Army FOCs (as cited in Hiromoto 2013, 10) 
 
 
Using capability managers at this level will facilitate clearer boundaries with 
regards to funding lines. One of the issues with SoS development, as noted earlier, is the 
often nebulous funding lines. The C-RAM, for example, had difficulty determining how 
much money was spent on C-RAM efforts as opposed to individual system efforts. 
Additionally, Capability Set 13 (CS13) is currently under the PEO C3-T, but integration 
efforts would likely incorporate PEOs from the GCS and the Soldier because the 
communication systems will be used and tested with equipment outside of the PEO C3Ts 
area of responsibility. The fact that CS13 potentially incorporates systems from several 
PEOs underscores the importance of establishing funding at the SoS level. Using 
capability managers at the PEO level and aligning the funding with the PEO managers 
could provide a way to fund and budget SoS acquisition programs. Another added benefit 
of having capability managers at the PEO and program levels is that it could facilitate 
bottom-up SoS engineering. As alluded to in Chapter IV, SoS and systems engineering is 
focused on a top-down approach, however, a bottom-up approach of the existing systems 
to better align them with an SoS would be beneficial when designing a baseline SoS 
architecture. According to Hiromoto (2013), in 2006 there were 104 individual systems 
that supported the Lethality and Force Protection FOCs. Table 5 identifies functional 
categories within the FOCs that had five or more individual systems. 
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Table 5.   Lethality and Force Protection Categories with Five or More 
Systems (from Hiromoto 2013) 
 
 
Using capability managers at the program level in conjunction with capability 
managers at the PEO level will facilitate the bottom-up analysis that is necessary to create 
an SoS architecture for a number of these individual systems that fall under the same 
functional category. 
Adding personnel to the JCIDS process or the acquisition process may seem like 
there is another level of added bureaucracy to a system that already takes years to 
produce complete systems. However, as suggested in the RENO report conducted in 
2009, which was referenced in a thesis written by LTC Douglas Cherry (2010), the Army 
should look at eliminating stovepipe organizations in the G3/5/7. These organizations 
contribute to a system perspective rather than an SoS perspective, and they are a part of 
the JCIDS process. The report specifically mentions organizations such as “Aviation 
(DAMO-AV), Biometric Task Force (BTF), Army Asymmetric Warfare Office 
(AAWO), Electronic Warfare (EW), and LANDWARNET/Battle Command (LB)” 
(Cherry 2010, 12). LTC Cherry goes on to suggest replacing these organizations with a 
capabilities and combined arms directorate. Although this study was conducted in 2009, 
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many of these organizations still exist in the Army in 2015. The Army should take a look 
at these organizations and eliminate the ones that do not contribute to an SoS approach to 
acquisitions. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed potential organizational changes that could facilitate an 
SoS engineering approach to current and future acquisitions. First, the Army should have 
an SoS engineer as part of the JCIDS process to ensure that there is an understanding 
from the beginning of the process on how the new acquisition fits into the greater SoS 
architecture. Further, the Army needs to have organic personnel that can perform or 
oversee the role of LSI so the Army does not empower the contractors too much during 
the SoS process. The FCS is an example of an LSI having too much authority. The Army 
also needs to expand the role of the capability manager to the PEO level, and align 
funding based on the eleven major FOCs as opposed to the PEOs. Finally, the Army 
should look at all stove-piped organizations that currently take part in the JCIDS process 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this research was to explore the idea of approaching future 
acquisitions from an SoS perspective. This would require SoS Engineering to take place 
as well as process and organizational changes to facilitate this culture shift. The study 
began with a brief history of the evolution of the Army acquisition process that led to an 
increase focus on SoS programs.  The thesis then discussed the major steps of the Army’s 
current acquisition process. The study then focused on addressing the following research 
questions:  
1. What are some of the lessons learned and best practices that can be 
gleaned from the Army’s past attempts at SoS acquisitions? 
2. What current processes in the Army acquisition system should change, be 
created, or be implemented as policy in order to facilitate systems 
engineering from an SoS perspective? 
3. What organizational changes in the Army need to take place to facilitate a 
successful SoS engineering process? 
The literature review discussed pertinent definitions regarding systems 
engineering and SoS engineering. It went on to discuss the systems engineering process 
in acquisitions, the SoS engineering model, and the core elements of SoS engineering. 
The third chapter examined three previous SoS acquisitions by the Army, and analyzed 
these acquisitions using the core elements of SoS engineering. Using the lessons learned 
from these three programs, Chapter IV discussed some of the process changes that would 
facilitate an SoS approach to future acquisitions. The following chapter, building on the 
lessons learned in Chapter III, and the process changes from Chapter IV, discussed 
organizational changes, specifically personnel changes that would facilitate an SoS 
engineering approach to acquisitions. 
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A. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study suggest that an SoS engineering approach to future Army 
acquisitions is not only possible, but necessary. The Army is part of a joint force with 
systems that will become increasingly connected. The military is currently divided into 
Combatant Commands. The Combatant Commanders (COCOM) have the great 
responsibility of managing any conflict within their region. COCOMs lead a diverse 
group of forces. A COCOM commander has personnel and equipment from all military 
branches, but currently the acquisition process is set up so that each branch conducts its 
own acquisitions, and within the branches, each PEO is responsible for acquisitions in his 
or her domain. As a result of this process, COCOMs often get redundant systems fielded 
between services, as well as redundant systems within the services. Currently, the 
acquisition process does not align with how the military is task organized to fight and win 
wars. Using an SoS approach with SoS engineering principles would be the first step for 
the Army to align itself with the way the military is set up to fight wars. The next step 
would be implementing this SoS approach in a joint environment that incorporates all the 
military services. 
An SoS approach does not mean that individual system engineering principles and 
practices are obsolete. Developing individual systems will still be important and 
necessary. The difference with an SoS approach is that the greater system will always be 
at the forefront when new acquisitions take place. This means that even as the systems 
engineering for an individual system is being conducted, the individual system should 
complement the SoS engineering that is being done to the SoS.  
The transition from a system-based to an SoS-based acquisition will take a lot of 
effort. Understanding the relationships between a system and its SoS will require 
significant coordination and flexibility. Some of the process changes recommended will 
require a cultural shift from the way the Army has been acquiring systems. For example, 
the integrated architecture that incorporates DODAF views in the ICD will require SoS 
engineers who have a complete understanding of constituent systems and their 
relationships. It will also force designers to think about future systems when designing 
and building a particular SoS iteration. Engineers that are used to optimizing individual 
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systems will have to operate in trade space and potentially build a system sub-optimally 
for the greater good of the SoS. Additionally, the way the acquisition force is trained will 
also have to change. The acquisition force must develop capability managers who can 
provide macro level management of capabilities in their FOCs. These trained capability 
managers can assist in providing a better method of funding and cost accounting for SoS 
acquisitions. Currently, there is not much of an incentive for program managers to 
sacrifice for the SoS because program managers are focused on delivering their product 
within cost and schedule. Changing the funding to align with SoS acquisitions will 
encourage program managers to approach their programs from an SoS perspective. 
Perhaps the most important part of this cultural shift is education for the future 
acquisition workforce. The Army has substantial training on the acquisition process, and 
systems engineering within the acquisition process, however, SoS engineering is not 
emphasized in training the future acquisition force. The Army needs to incorporate SoS 
training in acquisitions. The Army has taken steps to incorporate SoS by establishing an 
SoS engineering and integration directorate. This directorate has already been beneficial 
to SoS programs that have leveraged their expertise. The Army should build off of this 
expertise and look into incorporating some of the process and organizational changes that 
will facilitate an SoS-approach to future Army acquisitions. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
There is significant opportunity for further research on this study. This research 
examined three SoS programs that the Army conducted. There are several other lessons 
learned from other SoS programs that were not covered. There are also important lessons 
learned that could be gained from studying individual systems acquisitions. This study 
examined MDAP acquisition, but there are also several smaller programs that could 
benefit from a study of how the smaller individual systems would fit into a larger SoS 
framework.  These smaller programs that don’t classify as MDAPs seem to receive less 
attention because of their lower costs.  This research recommends process changes to the 
major steps of the acquisition process; however, a more in-depth look at some of the 
underlying processes in the acquisition system should also be examined for potential 
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changes. Additionally, a feasibility study on the proposed changes recommended in this 
study, as well as any future changes suggested, would be beneficial before these 
processes were implemented in the acquisition process. Furthermore, this study did not 
benefit from any specific firsthand accounts of the acquisition process from acquisition 
professionals, or key members of the acquisition community. Further research should 
incorporate interviews from PEOs, PMs, and other personnel on their personal 
experiences with system or SoS acquisitions. 
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